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INDEX.
ACCEPTANCE. See BILLS AND NOTES, 34. CONTRACT, 4, 5. SUNDAY, 6.
Where the acceptance by an attorney of an order drawn upon him by his client
after the recovery of a verdict is conditioned upon the collection of the judg-
ment, it is not binding if the verdict is set aside and a new verdict subsequently
obtained for a smaller amount. .Rawson v. Beach, 697.
ACCOUNT. See DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 3. EQUITY, 15. ERRORS AND Ap-
PEALS, 15. LIMITATIONS, STATUTE Or, 2. PARTNERSHIP, 7.
&CKNOWLEDGMENT. See EVIDENCE, 5.
&.CTION. See ADMIRALTY, 12. ARBITRATION, 1. BILLS AND NOTES, 13.
COVENANT, 1, 3. EASEMENT, 2. LANDLORD AND TENANT, 1. MASTER
AND SERVANT, 1. PAUPER.
1. Will not lie at law to recover money decreed to be paid in equity. Boyle
v. Schindler 273.
2. Payee may bring suit in his own name on an accepted order. Bacon v.
Bates, 620.
3. The fact that the negotiability of the order is restricted, being for an
uncertain amount, does not affect the payee's right to enforce it. Id.
4. Property owner in city cannot maintain action against a water company
for special damage through a failure of the company to furnish water as
required by its contract with the city. Davis v. Clinton Waterworks Co., 550.
5. The fact that a railroad company in constructing its road has filled up an
artificial ditch on the land of a third person, and thus turned back water upon
plaintiff's premises, is no cause of action. O'Connor v. The Fond du Lac, A.
P. Railroad Co., 550.
6. Where one pays money to an administrator for land, and takes timber
therefrom, knowing that the administrator cannot convey title, he cannot,
upon the refusal of some of the heirs to join in a conveyance, bring suit to
recover his money without offering to rescind the contract, or surrender pos-
session, or pay for the timber. Byslip v. French, 624.
7. Cannot be maintained against a railroad upon a written contract signed
by the trustees of the mortgage bondholders. Chaffee v. Rutland Railroad Co.,
807.
8. A court of chancery could charge upon the trust property the legitimate
expenses incurred in managing it; but not even this upon the bondholders
personally. 2"d.
9. Distinction between the powers of an agent and trustee. Id.
10. The plaintiff, being a stockholder in the defendant company, is charged
with knowledge of the capacity in which the trustee was acting. Id.
ACTS OF CONGRESS.
1866, July 27. See REMOVAL ON CAUSES, 7, 8.
1867, March 2. See REMOVAL Or CAUSES, 7, 8.
1874, Revised Statutes.
Sect. 639. See REMOVAL ON CAUSES, 1-7.
Sect. 649. See ERRoRs AND APPEALS, 4.
Sect. 700. See ERRORS AND APPEALS, 5.
Sect. 739. See UNITED STATES COURTS, 6.
Vom. XXIX.-103 (817)
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ACTS OF CONGRESS.
Sect. 858. See EVIDENCE, 27.
Sect. 914. See ERRORS AND APPEALS, 2.
Sect. 1004. See ERRORS AND APPEALS, 1.
Sect. 1005. See ERRORS AND APPEALS, 1.
Sect. 1012. See ERRORS AND APPEALS, 14.
Sect. 4250. See VESSEL, 1.
Sect. 4283. See ADMIRALTY, 6.
1874, June 22. See DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, R
1875, March 3. See REMOVAL OF CAUSES, 1-7.
ADMINISTRATOR. See EXECUTOR.
ADMIRALTY. See ERRORS AND APPEALS, 12, 21. VESSZL.
I. Collision.
1. Negligence on part of vessel entering harbor and colliding with vessel as
anchor, will not be presumed but must be shown. Shephcrd v. The Cla-a,
410.
2. Where injured vessel kept no watch on deck she cannot recover. Id.
3. Waere a collision is caused by the negligence of one vessel, but the damage
would not have been sustained but for the negligence of the other, the loss
should be divided equally. The Margaret, 757.
4. The jurisdiction of courts of admiralty over suits in personam for dam-
ages by collision is not exclusive; but there is also a remedy at common law.
Schoonmaker v. Gilnore, 71.
5. Steamer approaching, sailing vessel must govern herself according to the
latter's actual and not probable course, and it is negligence to go so close that a
slight change in the latter's course, in a moment of seeming peril, will cause a
collision. Steamship Benefizctor v. Mount, 273.
II. Liability of Shipowners.
6. The 56th Admiralty Rule does not preclude a party from claiming, after
the trial of the cause, the limitation of liability provided for by sect. 4283
Revised Statutes. N. Y. J- Vilaington S. S. (Co. v. Mount, 620.
7. But if such limitation is claimed after trial the matters adjudicated can-
not be reopened or the due course of appeal prevented. Id.
8. Where the claim is made during the progress of the cause it is in the
discretion of the court to require that evidence already taken shall be received
and used in the limitation proceedings. Id.
9. The claim would be ineffectual as against a party if made after he had
raceived satisfaction of his demand, but the omission to claim the limitation as
to one does not preclude the owners from claiming it as to others suffering
loss by the same collision. Id.
10. In certain cases of laIches in making the claim, it ought not to be allowed
except upon condition of compensating the other party for costs and expenses.
Id.
11. The proper criterion of the owner's liability is the amount at which the
vessel is appraised or sold in the admiralty proceedings, or if surrendered, her
value at the time of surrender. Id.
12. Libel sustainable by father to recover for loss of services of minor son
killed in a collision. The Garland, 742, and note.
13. Admiralty courts. will enforce, by proceeding in rein, a right -conferred
by a state statute upon an administrator to recover damages for loss of life. Id.
III. &lvage.
14. The test whether services rendered by a pilot were salvage s~rvices is,
whether the attendant risk was such that the pilot could& not be reasonably
expected to perform the services for pilfotage reward. Akerblomov. Tice, 814.
AGENT. See ACTION, 9. ATTORNEY, 7, 12. BILL4 iND NOTES,'16. Es-
TOPPrEL, 10. GUARANTY, 2.
1. When a person conducts a business requiring thd'services of a clerk and
manager, there is a repre~ent ation:,ltat the.parties engagel in the performance
of.thfse services air his agents with necessary powers., )Lodt v. Gele, 416.
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2. One giving excluive credit to a disclosed agent cannot hold the princi-
pal. Lochte v. Gde, 416.
3. The manner of charging upon the books of a merchant furnishes prima
fade evidence as to the placing of the credit. Id.
4. A travelling salesman has apparent authority to collect as well as sell, and
payment to him is a good defence. Putnam v. French, 807.
5. Where an agent commingles the money of the principal with his own and
purchases property, it belongs to the principal; but if he commingles his
goods with those of his principal they are tenants in common as to his creditors.
Safford v. Gallup, 808.
6. One appointed by a company to have charge of a store has no authority to
give notes of the company to procure loans. Perkins v. Boothby, 274.
7. Principal liable for money' knowingly retained by him, which was bor-
rowed and applied for his benefit by his agent without authority. Id.
8. An agent for sale of land with general powers, may make sale on credit
in accordance with a general custom. Silverman v. Bullock, 411.
9. Where such an agent takes notes to himself for the price secured by
mortgage and trust deeds which he puts on record, the principal will be held
to have notice thereof. Id.
10. As against a subsequent purchaser of such notes fdr value the principal
cannot have the sale of the lots set aside even though fraudulent. Id.
11. The rule that a power to confess judgment must be strictly pursued,
must not be applied so rigidly as to defeat the intention. Keith v. Kellogg,
207.
12. Where authority is without any limitation, and it may be lawfully done
in two or more ways, it may be executed in either of the ways. Id.
13. Where by the whole instrument it appears to have been the intention to
bind the principal, it will be his deed although signed by the agent in his own
name. Purinton v. Security Life Ins. Co., 808.
14. Where joint and several power is conferred upon the members of a firm,
the execution of an instrument by one is valid. Id.
15. Where the declaration alleges an instrument to be the deed of the
defendant, it must be so regarded upon demurrer, if it could be, legally, the
deed of the defendant. Id.
16. Where after judgment against two persons it is discovered that they
were acting as agents for themselves and a third person previously undisclosed,
the judgment, though unsatisfied, is a bar to a recovery against such third
person. Kendall v. Hamilton, 516, and note.
ALIMONY. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 7.
AMENDMENT. See REPLEVIN, 7. TRIAL, I.
1. Where the complaint for work and labor implied, but did not expressly
allege, a written contract and the answer set up a special contract and alleged
non-performance, an amendment of the complaint at the trial was not improperly
allowed, and where the amendment was made orally, and not formally filed,
but was treated as made, it is an effectual amendment to support a verdict and
judgment. Kretser v. Cary, 757.
2. A complaint setting up a purely legal cause of action cannot be amended
by setting up a cause of action in equity. Carmichael v. Argard, 553.
3. The right to make such amendment cannot be claimed on the ground of
mistake where there was no mistake of facts but merely an erroneous belief of
counsel as to the law. Id.
4. In the absence of anything to show that an order or judgment was differ-
ent from that actually entered, no correction can be made by a nunc pro tune
entry at a subsequent term. Fetters v. Baird, 558.
5. The recital in an attachment sur judgment, that the judgment had been
recovered in March instead of February, is a clerical error which may be
amended. Bank v. Wreckler, 350.
ANNUITY. See WILL, 6.
APPORTIONMENT. See WILL, 6.
820 INDEX.
ARBITRATION. See SALE, 12.
1. The acts of all arbitrator are performed in a judicial capacity, and he can-
not be held liable in a civil action for damages therefor. Jones v. Brown, 620.
2. A parol submission and award may be binding, but the agreement to ar-
bitrate should be duly established. Koon v. .follingsworth, 274.
3. Parol evidence admissible to show misconduct of arbitrators. Bridge-
port v. Eiseman, 135.
4. Irregularities not so serious as to show corruption are covered by an
agreement that tie arbitrators might proceed informally. id.
5. Excessive award not sufficient to prove corruption. Id.
ARSON. See CRIMINAL LAw, 25.
ASSAULT AND BATTERY. See TREsrAss, 6.
ASSIGNMAENT. See DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 23-25. MAIL, 1. PARTNER-
SHIP, 9.
A creditor cannot, without the consent of the debtor, assign part of his
claim. Beardslee v. Moryner, 808.
ASSUMISIT. See BILLS AND NOTES, 6. EQUITY, 5. PARTNERSHIP, 4. TRUST, 3.
1. Cannot be mahtitincd to recover a sum of money promised to be loaned.
Conway v. Building Associti',,,. 274.
2. Whether an action for breach of contract in not loaning the money, can
be maintained quirre. Id.
3. Where one calls a lhysician to render services to a member of his house-
hold, lie is prinafcie liable to pay the bill. Hentiy v. Kernke, 550.
4. Does not lie tbr volunteered services rendered under circumstances which
do not indicate expectation of reward. Coe v. Wager, 136.
5. One may waive trover and bring assulipsit for property appropriated by
defendant, but lie must show what property has been so used. Id.
6. Where mortgaged goods have been converted and sold, the mortgagee
cannot bring assutnpsit for the amount received. Carpenter v. Graham, 206.
ATTACHMENT. See AMENDMENT, 5. DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 8. GARNISH-
MENT. IUSBAND AND VIFE, 23. LANDLORD AND TENANT, 9. UNITED
STATES COURTS, 5.
1. Statute authorizing attachment on ground of intended removal of pro-
perty out of the state, contemplates a permanent removal and not a temporary
use of the property out of the state. Warder v. T.hrilkeld, 71.
2. When property has been conveyed by the defendant to the alleged trustee
and not purchased by the trustee, any balance in his hands above the amount
the defendant owed him, is attachable by creditors. Barker v. Osborne, 356.
3. Where it appears that at one time prior to the attachment the trustee
held attachable funds, the burden is on him to show payment to the defendant
before the attachment. Id.
ATTORNEY. See BANKRUPTCY, 4. BILLS AND NOTES, 2. EQUITY, 16, 18.
JUDGMENT, 1.
1. Is entitled to taxable costs in his own suit. State v. Berry, 206.
2. Is responsible to third person for aid given to client beyond his profes-
sional duties. Schalk v. Kingsley, 207.
3. Court will not defeat lien of by carrying out a stipulation between the
parties to set aside judgment. Brainard v. Elwood, 207.
4. Authority to appear before any court of record and confess judgment
may be exercised before the clerk of the court either in term time or vacation.
Keith v. Kellogg, 207.
5. When a party to a suit and appearing in his own behalf is entitled to the
allowances made by the fee bill for his services, except a retaining fee. /aacke
v. Mayor, 4-c., 261, and note.
6. Knowledge acquired while acting for one client will not affect another
client. Ford v. French, 551.
7. The court has summary jurisdiction to compel the town agent of a solici-
tor to pay the client the amount of his debt received in an action. Exparts
Edwards, 758.
8. It is not only the right but the duty of a court to disbar on cause shown.
&out v. Proctor, 351.
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9. Conviction of infamous crime, sufficient ground for disbarring. Matter
of McGarthy, 136.
10. A bar association cannot be recognised or control the prosecution in pro-
ceedings to disbar. Id.
11. Disbarred attorney cannot represent any person in court as attorney.
agent or otherwise. Cobb v. Judge of Supreme Court, 411.
12. A party cannot appear in court by an agent who is not an attorney. In.
AUCTIONEER
Neglect tc pay over proceeds of sale is a breach of a bond conditioned that
an auctioneer shall '! well and faithfully perform all the duties of said office."
Tripp v. Barton, 621.
BAIL. See VESSEL, 7, 14.
BAILMENT. See CORPORATION, 3. WAREHOUSEMAN, 2.
Where a sewing-machine lease gave the tenant the right to purchase by pay-
ing the full amount of the rent, but reserved to the lessor all property in the
machine and the control thereof until such purchase. Held, that in case of
default the lessor could dispossess the lessee. Smith v. Lozo, 212.
BA.'rK. See EXECUTORS AND ADMsINISTRATORS, I. NATIONAl. BANK. NEGLI-
GENCE, 1. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT, 3.
B&NKRUPTCY. See DEBTOR ANDI CREDITOR, 6. NYEGLIGENCE, 8. PA&TIER-
SHIP, 8.
I. Effect of Proceedings.
I. Where a judgment is rendered against a bankrupt in his own name, he
will be allowed to prosecute a writ of error. Bill v. Harding, 274.
2. In such case, if the assignee is of opinion that any of the questions in-
volved may affect the estate, he will be heard on such questions. Id.
I. Fraud.
3. An Act of the debtor which allows judgment to be taken earlier than it
could otherwise have been done, is a procuration. Rodgers v. Palmer, 351.
4. Reasonable cause to believe insolvency and knowledge of the fraud must
be shown, but the knowledge of the creditor's attorney is his own knowledge. Id.
IM. Discharge.
5. Validity of discharge cannot be contested in stat court because of inten-
tional omission of plaintiff's name from list of creditors. Baily v. Corruthers,
351.
6. Discharge does not relieve from debt to the United States. Smih v.
Hodson, 136.
7. Debtor held liable for contribution to co-surety upon debt to government
paid by co-surety after the discharge. Id.
BIGAMY. See CRIMINAL LAw, II.
BILL OF EXCEPTIONS.
1. Rule requiring presentation of, in five days, is not binding on the judge.
Hunnicut v. Peyton, 72.
2. Taking writ of error before signing of the bill is not a waiver of the ex-
ceptions. Id.
. Bill not invalid because dated and filed as of date subsequent to trial. Id.
4. To have a decision on the plea of nul tiel record reviewed, the bill of ex-
ceptions must set forth the record, the ruling of the court and the exception.
Bank v. Wrecider, 351.
5. Where the error assigned is that the court erroneously charged that the
evidence tended to show certain facts, the bill must contain the whole evidence.
Potter v. Bank, 351.
BILLS AND NOTES. See AGENT, 6. DURESS, 1. INFANT, 6. LIMITA-
TIONS, STATUTE o, 4. MfORTGAGE, 9. NEW TRIAL, 4. PLEADING; 2.
1. Form, Consideration, 4-c.
1. A note in the form, "I promise to pay," &c,, signed by two or more
persons is joint and several. Dill v. Wite, 551.
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2. Promissory note containing stipulation for attorney's fees loses its char-
acter as a note and becomes a mere contract. irst National Bank v. Jacubs
809.
3. The words "or order" are not necessary to make an instrument nego-
tiable. Fawcett v. NVational Life Ins. Co., 207.
4. A draft in which no time for payment is mentioned is payable on de-
mand, notwithstanding that it calls for interest after maturity. First Nat.
Bank v. ice, 72.
5. The addition "Vestryman Grace Church" to each signer's name does
not make it the note of the corporation. Tilden v. Barnard, 412.
I. Rights of Parties. See infra, III.
6. Giving a promissory note for a debt does not discharge the debt, and
assumpsit may he maintained therefor if the note be produced for cancellation.
Walsh v. Lennon, 411.
7. When the maker of the note proves that it had its origin in fraud, tho
holder must prove that he received it before due, bona fide and for value; ho
need not, however, prove want of knowledge of the facts constituting the
fraud, the burden being on defendant to show such knowledge. Johnson v.
McMurry, 551.
8. Where the cashier of a bank is one of the makers and payees, the bank
cannot take the note as a bona fide holder without notice. Tilden v. Barnard
412.
9. A finding that a note was transferred before maturity for a valuable
consideration, and that the transferree had no knowledge of the details of its
origin, cannot be regarded as equivalent to a finding that he was a bona flde
holder for value. 2d.
10. In order to constitute misappropriation of accommodation paper, the
misuse must be tainted with fraud. Jackson v. Bank, 136.
1I. Where such paper is given to be used as collateral security for a new
loan, it is not misappropriation to deposit it as security for an antecedent loan.
Id.
12. Guarantor of note not entitled to notice of demand and refusal. Singer
Manufacturing Co. v. Hester, 136.
13. Where a note has been materially altered, without fraudulent intent,
the payee may recover upon proof of the original consideration. Morrison v.
Huggins, 206.
14. A deposit by the maker of a note at maturity, of the money for its pay.
ment at the bank at which the note is payable, is a good defence to an action
by the holder, who failed to present the note until after the insolvency of the
bank. Horan v. Lazier, and note, 542.
15. Bona fide purchaser of promissory note secured by deed of trust, with-
out notice of payments, is entitled to enforce the deed for the full amount.
Goodfellow v. Stillwell, 809.
16. Where the deed of trust authorizes the trustee to receive payment, the
purchaser will be deemed to have constituted the trustee his agent for that
purpose, if he do not revoke the authority. Id.
III. Endorsement, Acceptance, &c. See supra, I.
17. Endorser admits that previous endorsements were duly made, and war.
rants the title and genuineness of the paper he transfers. Fish v. Urst Nat.
Bank, 275.
18. One who receives negotiable paper need not look beyond the signature
of the last endorser. Id.
19. Presumption as to liability of one who endorses a note to which he is
not a party is that he is a guarantor, but this presumption may be rebutted.
Andrews v. Congar, 328.
20. Plaintiff suing on guaranty is not bound to prove execution of note un-
less denied under oath. Id.
21. Review of decisions as to liability of a stranger to a note who endorses
it before delivery. Id., note, 331.
22. To hold a -third party who irregularly endorses a promissory note, as
INDEX. 823
BILLS AND NOTES.
joint maker, he must have participated in the creation of the note or shared
in the consideration. Hayden v. 11'eldon, 698.
23. Endorsing the note before the payee imports only the contract of second
endorsee. Id.
24. Where the undertaking of a third party is to further secure the payment
of a debt already created between the regular parties to the note, it is within
the Statute of Frauds, requiring a writing. Id.
25. Such an endorsement is not in itself authority to the holder of the note
to write over it a contract of guaranty. Id.
26. A guaranty is not negotiable, nor does it become so by being endorsed
upon negotiable paper. Id.
27. Endorser cannot escape liability to purchaser for value by showing that
the endorsement was made merely to pass title, and under a verbal agreement
that the words "without recourse" should be added. Lewis v. Dunlap, 487.
28. A defence by one who endorsed a note to which he was not a party
that he endorsed it as guarantor only, and that there was a want of due
diligence in pursuing the maker, is sufficient. Withers v. Berry, 487.
29. Note payable to maker's own order, and endorsed by him, becomes pay-
able to bearer. Bishop v. Rowe, 352.
30. Where a stranger to such note, who has given the holder his obligation,
to be holden as if he had endorsed it is obliged to pay it, lie is entitled to it,
and may sue on it in his own name. .d.
91. Accommodation endorser of note payable on demand with interest, is
not liable as a joint maker and is entitled to notice of dishonor. %wyer v.
Brownell, 698.
32. Effect of endorsement in blank and right of endorsee to fill up and sub-
sequently alter same. Fawsett v. National Lfe Insurance Co., 207.
33. Endorsement by third person for collection does not destroy the negotia-
bility of the note. Id.
34. Evidence is not admissible to change the meaning of the acceptance of a
draft as apparent on its face. Hunting v. Eniart, 808.
BOND. See AUCTIONEER. MUNICIPAL BOND. SURETY, 7.
1. Bond of a town treasurer not executed till near the close of his term but
ante-dated, binds his sureties for defaults during the year for which he was
elected but not for prior defaults. Town qf Barnet v. Abbott, 698.
2. When the bond was delivered it was sealed, but the sureties had never
sealed it nor authorized any one to do so. 1teld, defectively executed. Id.
3. The ante-dating of the bond and the fact that it was not sealed at the
time it was executed may be shown by parol. Id.
4. An official bond need not follow the words of the statute if it uses words
of the same legal effect. Tripp v. Barton, 621.
BUILDING ASSOCIATION. See SURETY, 8.
BURDEN OF PROOF. See ATTACHMENT, 3. BILLS AND NOTEs, 7. Cow-
TRACT, 2. CRIMINAL LAW, 23, 24, 33. MASTER AND SERVANT, 4. NEG-
LIGENCE, 2, 5. PLEADING, I. TAX, 10.
BURGLARY. See CRIMINAL LAW, II.
BURIAL LOT. See TREsPAss, 1.
CANAL.
Must be maintained in such manner that it can be used with reasonable
safety, but the company is not liable for an injury resulting from an unknown
obstruction not discoverable with ordinary care. Pennsylvania Canal Co. T.
Burd, 72.
CASES AFFIRMED, COMMENTED ON, OVERRULED, ETC.
Albro v. Jaquith, 4 Gray 99, overruled. Osborne v. Morgan, 399.
Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, overruled. Kilbourn v. Thompsoq, C22.
Baddeley v. Baddeley, L. R., 9 Ch. Div. 113, observed upon. In re Bra.
ton's Estate, 811.
Besch v. Frolich, 1 Ph. 172, followed. Lyon v. Tweddell, 813.
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CASES AFFIRMED, COMMENTED ON, OVERRULED, ETC.
Boyes v. Bedale, 1 H. & M. 798, disapproved. In re Goodman's Trusts, 810.
Buck v. Colbath, 3 Wall. 334, distinguished. Heynan v. Cove, 171.
Byrne & Co. v. Leon Van Tienhoven & Co., 49 L. J. C. P. 316, followed.
Stevenson v. McLean, 16.
Day v. Cummings, 19 Vt. 496, distinguished. McDonald v. Smith, 631.
Douglass v. Howland, 24 Wend. 35, followed. Exparte Young, B15.
Duncan v. Gilbert, 5 )utcher 521, approved. Jackson v. The Bank, 136.
Freeman v. Howe, 24 How. 450, distinguished. Ileyrman v. Corel, 171.
Fox v. Hawks, L. R., 13 Ch. Div. 822, observed upon. In re Breton's
Estate, 811.
Hoare r. Rcnnie, 5 II. & N. 19, flollowed. 1touck v. Muller, 814.
Hoover v. West, 91 U. S. 308, distinguished. Rodgers v. Palner, Z51.
Humphrey v. Pegnes, 16 Wall. 244, distinguished. East Tennessee, V. 4. G.
Railroad Ca. v. lamblen C.. 421.
Jolly v. Rees, 15 C. B. (N. S.) 628, followed and approved. Debenham r.
Mellon, 316.
King r. Hoare, 13 M. & W. 494, followed and approved. Kendall v. Ham-
ilton, 516.
Lumley v. Gyc, 2 E. & B. 216, discussed and followed. Bowen v. 11all, 578.
Lvndc r. Winnebago Co., 16 Wall. 6, distinguished. Wells v. Board of
Supervisors, 213.
Milroy v. Lord, 4 D. F. & J. 264, followed. I re Breton's Estate, 811.
Morgan v. Louisiana, 93 U. S. 217, followed. East Tennessee, V. 4- G.
Railroad Co. v. lainblen Co. 421.
Newman v. Willetts, 52 Ill. 98, distinguished. Bennett v. Stout, 418.
Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U. S. 716, distinguished. McCleary v. Ellis, 180.
Norris v. Springer, 18 Me. 324, considered. Snith v. Loomis, 811.
Sheldon v. South School District, 24 Coun. 88, commented on. Seeley T.
Westport, 143.
Vannever v. Bryant, 21 Wall. 43, distinguished. Jzfkins v. Sweetser, 282.
Waterbury Saving Bank v. Lawler, 46 Conn. 243, commented on. Seeley
v. Westport, 143.
CAVEAT EMPTOR. See SHERIr"S SALE.
CEMETERY LOT. See TRESPASS, 1.
CERTIORARI. See EnnoRs AND APPEALS, 6.
CHARTER. See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONe, 28, 29.
CHATTEL MORTGAGE. See MORTGAGE, I.
CITIZENSHIP. See U. S. COURTS, 8.
CLUB.
1. Decision of a club acting under its rules, will not be interfered with
unless the rules are contrary to justice, or the decision is contrary to the rules,
or there has been nalafides. Dauwk-ins v. Antrobus, 809.
2. One of the rules of a club provided, that a general meeting might alter
any of the standing rules affecting the general interests of the club, provided
this was done with certain formalities and by a certain majority. Held, that a
rule providing for the expulsion of members who should be guilty of conduct
injurious to the interests of the club, was within the regulation. Id.
COLLATERAL SECURITY. See BILLS AND NOTES, 11. CoRPOIRUTION, 3.
SURETY, 2. WAREHOUSEMAN, 5.
COLLISION. See ADMIRALTY, I.
COMMITTEE. See MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 13, 14.
COMMON CARRIER. See CANAL. RAILROAD, 2, 11.
1. Is liable for loss by accidental fire of goods left with him to be forwarded.
Pittsburqh, C. 4* S. Railroad Co. v. Barrett, 406.
2. But not, if anything remained to be done by the shipper before forward
ing.' Id.
INDEX. 825
COMMON CARRIER.
3. The assent of the shipper to conditions limiting such liability is binding,
but will not be presumed if not clearly shown. Pittsburgh C. 4- S;. Railroad Co.
v. Barrett, 406.
4. The carrier will not be relieved by a custom known to the shipper, but
not clearly assented to by him as a condition of the contract. Id.
5. Is responsible for injurics to passengers which might have been avoided
by his exercise of extraordinary vigilance aided by the highest skill. Pennsyl-
vania Co. v. Roy, 245.
6. Must provide vehicles adequate for the safe conveyance of passengers and
is liable for the slightest negligence in that regard. Id.
7. A railroad company is liable for the negligence of the servants in a Pull-
man car forming part of the train. Id.
8. Evidence as to the poverty of the passenger or as to the number and ages
of his children, Held, irrelevant. Id.
9. General rule as to the liability of common carriers of passengers. Id.,
note.
10. Passenger riding in express car cannot recover if his position contributed
to the injury. Kentucky Central Railroad Co. v. Thomas, 126.
11. The conductor is not bound to know that a passenger is in the express
car. Id.
12. Railroad company liable for omission to use Westinghouse brakes. Id.
13. As to property retained in a passenger's own custody a ferryman is liable
only for defects in the boat or want of care in its management. Dudley v.
Camden 6- Phila. Ferry Co., 210.
14. If he carries the property gratuitously he is only liable for gross negli-
gence. Id.
15. Log driving and booming companies are not subject to the liabilities of
common carriers. Mann v. White River L. 4- B. Co., 734, and note.
CONDITIONAL SALE. See BAILMENT SALE, 11 4, 6.
CONFEDERATE STATES. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 11. ESTOPPEL, 5.
CONFLICT OF LAWS. See EVIDENCE, 28. HUSBAND AND WIFE, 2-5.
I. Suit cannot be maintained against a married woman on her note in :
state where she was legally incapable of*making a note, although the note in
suit was made in a state where she had such legal capacity. Hayden v. Stone,
621.
2. If in the state where suit is brought, service on the husband is necessary,
a failure to make such service renders the action fatally defective. Id.
3. The proper law for determining kindred under the English Statute of
Distributions is the international law adopted by the comity of states, and not
the local law. In re Goodman's Trusts, 810.
4. THE LAW OF DOMICILE IN CONNECTION WITH THE RIGHT OF SUC-
CESSION TO BOTH PERSONAL AND REAL ESTATE, 705.
CONGRESS. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1. CONTEMPT, 1-4.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See DAMAGES, 1. RAILROAD, 8. TAX, 7.
UNITED STATES COURTS, 1-5.
I. Powers of Congress.
1. The exemption of members of Congress from liability for spdech or debate
extends to the report of members of a committee in favor of punishing a wit-
ness for contempt; their expression of opinion as to the contempt and their vote
in favor of his imprisonment. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 621.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATION OF WAR CLAIMS FOR PROPERTY, 217.
II. Powers of State Legislatures.
3. A state may by legislation protect fish in non-navigable streams. Welltv
v. Snover, 75.
4. A statute making penal the use of nets in fishing, at particular times and
in certain counties, is not unconstitutional. Doughty v. Conover, 75.
5. A statute adding to a prisoner's term the time spent by him in confine-
ment for violation of prison rules is unconstitutional. Gross v. Rice, 275.
VOL. XXIX.-104
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6. In an action by the prisoner against the warden for such imprisonment
damages are recoverable, notwithstanding that the statute had never been
declared unconstitutional. Gross v. Rice, 275.
7. Statute repealing an act limiting the time within which crimes shall be
prosecuted is not an ex post facto law. State v. Moore, 72.
8. A statute which purports to authorize the prosecution of a person for an
offence previously committed, and as to which all prosecution was already
barred by statutes of limitation, is unconstitutional. Aloore v. State, 621.
9. A statute which in imposing a tax on the sale of liquors discriminates
against wine and beer imported from other states is unconstitutional, but can-
not be avoided on this ground by one selling other liquors within its terms.
Tiernan v. Rinker, 72.
10. Where the legislature has authorized the governor to enter into a con-
tract with a person to work for a definite period, it cannot, by a repeal of the
statute, prevent a recovery for the salary thereafter accruing under the con-
tract. Hall v. Wisconsin, 137.
11. A stay law passed by a seceding state, and giving time until the cessa-
tion of the Ordinance of Secession, is void as impairing the obligation of con-
tracts. Danids v. Tearney, 412.
12. Statutes requiring judgments against a city to le registered with tha
controller before payment does not impede the collection thereof, and is not
unconstitutional. Louisiana v. N w Orhans, 412.
13. If the defect in a proceeding consists in doing or omitting something
which the legislature might have made intnaterial by prior law, it may 1)e
made immaterial by subsequent law. Ton oj Iix v. Town of .Kendall, 275.
CONTEMPT. See Ennons ANt) AppEAts, 23. 31ANDA3Ius, 2.
1. The two houses of' Congre-s do not possess the samne general power of
punishing inr contempt, that is exercised by the houses of the English 'arlia-
ment. Kilhourn v. Tionqson. 622.
2. Whether a power of puni hnment for contempt exists, as necessary to their
legislative functions, qunare "Y Id.
3. No person can he punished for contumacy as a witness before either
house, unless his testimony is required in a matter into which the house has
jurisdiction to inquire. Id.
4. In a suit for fidse imprisonment, where the defendant justifies under the
process of either house of ('ongress, the resolution of such house and the war-
rant of its speaker are not conclusive. Id.
5. CONTE31PT OF CoURT, 81, 145, 217, 289, 361, 425.
CONTRACT. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 10. CORPORATION, 11. EVIDENCE,
12. HUSBAND AND VIFE, 18, IV. OFFICE, 1. 1UBLIC POLICY. RATI-
FICATION, I. SALE. SUNDAY, 1, 9. WATERS AND WATERCOURSES, 2.
1. Revocation of offer must be connunicated to the other party before his
dispatches his acceptance. Stevenson v. MeLean, 16, and note.
2. Where one is hired to work 1w the week, tile lurden of proof is upon
him to show a change as to term of service. State v. -uarnish Co., 699.
3. A contract by a father to give a farm after his death to his son in con-
sideration of support during his life, will be enforced in favor of the son
against the other children, and the fact that a will by which the father at-.
tempted to carry out the contract was void, will not affect the son's rights.
Hiatt v. Wilhams, 552.
4. Where there is no privity of contract between defendants ani plaintiff,
and the whole right of the latter is based upon a conditional acceptance of an
order, no right of action can arise if the condition is not perfdrmed. Gill v.
Weller, 352.
5. A certain acceptance of an order construed to be conditional. Id.
6. There being both a town and village within the town by the name of
Litchfield, a contract not to practice "within a radius of ten miles of Litch-
field." Held, to mean within ten miles of the centre of the village. Cook v.
Johnson, 266.
7. Such contract is not void- for failure to fix a period within which the d,-
fendant was not to practice. 1d.
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8. Where such contract is reasonable when made, subsequent circumstances
do not affect its operation. Cook v. Johnson, 266.
9. A contract to pay a certain sum per thousand for running logs and for
floating a part of them into a stream, is not devisible, and in an action for its
breach, the measure of recovery is the contract price less any damages from
breach of any part of the contract. Keystone L. 4 S. Manufacturing Co. v.
Dole, 412.
10. Where a contract is express, no provision can be implied. Id.
11. Failure to perform a contract to furnish water for floating logs is not
excused by an accidental breaking of the dam, if the contract does not provide
for accidents or if the dam can be repaired. Id.
12. In suit upon a contract to furnish stone enough to complete a bridge and
its approaches, the question being whether certain work was part of the ap-
proaches, held, error to refuse an instruction that the jury should consider the
condition of things at the time the contract was made, and not the condition as
subsequently developed by the operations of nature. Union Pacific Railroad
Co. v. Clopper, 488.
13. Held also error to refuse an instruction that the testimony of experts in
bridge building was entitled to due weight as to whether certain work was part
of the bridge. Id.
14. Money paid in part performance of an illegal contract not malum in se,
can be recovered back.if the other party has not performed the contract, and.
both parties have abandoned it before consummation. Congress, 4-c., Spring
03. v. Knowlton, 552.
15. This principle applied to a subscription to an illegal issue of stock in a
corporation. Id.
CONVERSION. See TxovR.
CORPORATION. See BILLS AND NOTES, 5. CONTRACT, 15. INJUNCTION, 4.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. RAILROAD. UNITED STATES COURTS, 8.
1. One may render himself liable as stockholder as well by his conduct as by
formal subscription. Griswold v. Seligman, 413.
2. Where persons who held stock in escrow voted upon it; they were held as
against creditors estopped from denying that they were stockholders. Id.
3. Where stock is held under a written contract as security for advances, it
is not competent to show a verbal understanding that the bailees were to have
toe right to vote. id.
4. In order to bind a subscriber to stock, it is not necessary that a certificate
shall be issued to him. Hawley v. Upton, 413.
5. An organization given by charter the usual powers and privileges of a
corporation, is liable as a corporation to any one suffering damages through a
negligent performance of its duties. Weymouth v. Penobscot Log Driving Co.,
353.
6. Where the charter of a log-driving company provides that it "may drive
all logs" in a certain stream, the power is permissive, but when the company
accepts the privilege, a duty to drive the logs results. Id.
7. Whether the agents of a corporation have been negligent in performing
their duties is a question for the jury. Id.
8. Where, through a failure to file a certificate, an association supposed to
be incorporated proves not to he so, the members are bound to share pro rata
the expenses incurred by the managers with a proportionate allowance in favor
of full paid stock as against that not full paid. Richardson v. Pitts, 208.
9. Transferree of stock under a forged transfer, does not acquire a right
against the company by estoppel by the mere fact of its registration of the
transfer and issue of a certificate. Simm v. Anglo-American Telegraph Co.,
159.
10. Extent of corporation's liability for issuing certificate upon forged
transfer.. fid. Note, 168.
ii. Equity will in many cases refuse relief to stockholder against unau-
thorized contract whre suit has been delayed until the contract was executed,
especially if plaintiff has, by his conduct misled others. Terry v. Eagle Lock
a., 137.
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12. Transfer of goods by insolvent corporation to two of its directors in
payment of a debt due them, is not per se fraudulent. Smith v. Speary, 73.
13. What acts amount to a delivery of the goods. Id.
14. PREFERRED STOCK, 633.
COSTS. See ATTORNEY, 1, 5.
I. Are within the discretion of the court below, and d decree will not bt
disturbed for an improper direction as to them. Dodge v. Stanhope, 758.
2. Appearance fees should not be allowed on exceptions to an auditor's
accounts, or other collateral proceedings upon petition. Id.
3. An assignee, suing in the name of his assignor, and failing, is liable for
costs. Davenport v. Elizabeth , 699.
4. Where defendants sever in their answers, each one is allowed his costs,
although they all employ the same solicitor. Putnam v. Clark, 758.
5. One sued in his official capacity as escheator cannot be made liable per-
sonally for costs. Han,stein v. Lynlum, 413.
6. Certain items of costs and their taxation considered. aake v. Alayor,
4-c., 261, and note.
COURTS. See CONTEMPT, 5. JUDGMENT, 2-3. JURISDICTION. NUISANCE,
4. REPLEViN, 1, 2. U. S. COURTS.
1. Because a law gives a court exclusive jurisdiction in specified eases, it
does not necessarily exclude it from all other jurisdiction. Howard v. La-
croix, 414.
2. Courts of limited autiority can entertain no jurisdiction not conferred by
the law creating them or by subsequent statute. Id.
COVENANT.
1. Semble, that the right of action for breach of warranty accrues when
damage is suffered, and successive acts causing damage amount to successive
breaches. Post v. Campan, 275.
2. An encumbrance is anything which burdens a title, and includes any
interest which diminishes the value of the land while it is cons itent with a
conveyance in fee. Id.
3. The elements of a cause of action are-l-() a breach of duty; and (2)
a damage resulting. Id.
4. A covenant runs with the land when its purpose is to give future pro-
tection to the title, but not when it simply protects against something imme-
diately affecting the title and causing present damage. Id.
CRIMINAL LAW. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 5, 7, 8. JunoR, 1-11.
I. Generally.
1. In a summary proceeding for a penalty, an exception to the statute must
be shown to be inapplicable by proper averments. Doughty v. Conover, 73.
2. The conviction must contain sufficient of the evidence to show the legal
propriety of the judgment. Id.
3. An indictment for murder charged in one count three defendants as prin-
cipals and in another two as principals, and the third as accessory before thi
fact. Held, to be no misjoinder. State v. llandin, 137.
4. Even if a misjoinder, it could not be taken advantage of by motion in
arrest of judgment or on error. Id.
5. It is not the right of the accused to be present at the examination of wit-
nesses before the grand jury. Id.
6. A court cannot allow evidence as to the proceedings within the grand
jury room; and the State's attorney has no right, by demurrer or in any other
mode, to admit allegations in the plea as to such proceedings. Id.
7. In Indiana, criminal prosecutions can only be maintained for offenckm
prescribed by statute, but courts resort to the common law for interpretation
of the terms of the statute. Indiana v. Burdetta, and note, 342.
8. The right of lot-owners to have a street maintained free from obstruction
may be vindicated by indictment. Id.
9. A writ of error lies on a judgment quashing an indictment on demurrer.
State v. Hodges, 759.
10. The offence of receiving stolen goods is, in Maryland, a misdemeanor
INDEX.
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and it is not necessary to allege in the indictment that the property was
feloniously received, nor that the traverser received them for the purpose of
converting them to his own use. State v. Hodges, 759.
11. It is not necessary that the receiving should be lucri causa. Id.
12. An indictment for receiving stolen goods, a common-law offence, should
charge that thesame were unlawfully received. Id.
13. Where one is charged with a common-law offence, the mere averment
that it was done contra pacem, does not dispense with the necessity of setting
out the circumstances. Id.
14. It is not error to permit an attorney assisting the state's attorney to
make the opening statement to the jury. State v. Stark, 488.
15. While it is improper for a juror to ask advice of the court officer, and
for such officer to communicate such inquiry to the prosecuting attorney, yet if
the officer made no response and the defendant was not prejudiced, the convic-
tion will not be set aside. Id.
16. In the absence of evidence of conspiracy between father and son, ante-
cedent threats made by the son are inadmissible in evidence on the trial of an
indictment for assault upon the father. Id.
17. Judgment upon conviction of an offence not capital, will not be
reversed for an omission to enter of record the address of the judge asking the
prisoner if he has anything to say why sentence should not be pronounced. Id.
18. Almanac admissible to show when the moon rose on a certain night,
without proof of the character of the almanac, and although the time indi-
cated was a prediction. Munskower v. The State, 699.
19. Admissions which tend to criminate a third party, are not within the
rules of law that exclude confessions induced by promises. State v. Carr,
622.
20. Declarations of a party assaulted, made to persons who ran to his assist-
ance, immediately after the assault but in the absence of the prisoner, are inad-
missible. State v. Pomeroy, 623.
21. Where two offences are committed at the same place and time, under
such circumstances as to constitute a continuous accomplishment of a common
design, evidence of both is admissible upon a trial for one. State v. Greenwade,
552.
22. The refusal of a witness to answer, upon the ground that he may thereby
criminate himself, cannot be used against him upon his subsequent trial for the
game offence. State v. Bailey, 552.
23. The burden of proving insanity, by evidence which will reasonably
satisfy the jury, rests on the defendant. State v. .Redemeier, 209.
I. Bigamy.
24. Where the prisoner proves that at the time of his marriage with the
person named in the indictment as his lawful wife, he had another wife living
by a previous marriage, it is error to instruct the jury that the burden is on him
to show that this first wife was still alive at the time of the commission of the
offence charged in the indictment. Queen v. Willshire, 717, and note.
I. .Burglary.
25. It would be burglary, to break into, and arson, to burn a house, during
the temporary absence of the occupants. Stupetski v. Ins. Co., 418.
IV. Embezzlenent.
26. Municipal officer may be indicted for embezzling money of the city
though collected by him in excess of his authority. He is estopped from
denying the municipality's ownership. State v. Spaulding, 109.
V False Pretence.
27. To constitute a false pretence, a misrepresentation must relate to a past
event or existing fact, not to something to be done in the future. Stockng v.
Howard, 810.
VI. Forgery.
28. The forgery of a note with intent to defraud is punishable, although the
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defendant be not able to utter it, and passing the note knowing it to be forged,
is a separate felony also punishable. Parker v. The People, 275.
29. While a count for fbrging and a count for passing the instrument may
be joined in one indictment, a separate judgment cannot be had under each
count. Id.
VII. Larceny.
30. Where one enters a car in one ccunty, with intent to commit a larceny,
and commits the larceny after it passes into another county, the oflnce is
indictable in the latter county. Powell et al. v. The State, 759.
VIII. MIurder.
31. If a party arms himself with a deadly weapon, with the intent to com-
pel another to do any certain thing, or upon his refusal, to kill him, such
conditional intent is sufficient to make the homicide murder in the first degree.
State v. Kearly, 759.
32. The court, in defining reasonable doubt, said: That to exclude such
doubt, the evidence must be such as to produce in the minds of prudent men
such certainty, that they wouhl act on the conviction without hesitation, in
their own mo.t important affairs. field, not error. Id.
33. Burden of proving circumstances in mitigation or excuse is not thrown
on the defendant, if such facts appear from the evidence for the prosecution.
Alexander v. The People, 73.
34. No higher degree of proof is required in regard to such circumstances,
than in regard to any other fact. If there is a reasonable doubt the prisoner
should be acquitted. Id.
CUSTOM. See AGENT, 8. COMXON CARRIER, 4.
DAMAGES. See EVIDENCz, 7. INTEREST, 1. NEGLIGENCE, 6, 13. Nui-
8ANCE, 7. RAILROAD, 10. REPLEVIN, 4. SEDUCTION, 2. TRESPASS,
2, 6.
1. A corporation is not liable for consequential damages arising from the exer-
cise, without negligence, of the right of eminent domain conferred on it by the
legislature. Sumner v. Richardson Lake Dam Co., 353.
2. In suit by a mortgagee for injury to the mortgaged premises, the measure
01 tlamages is the diminution in the value of the security, and not the depre-
ciation in the property. Schalk v. Kingsley, 209.
3. Each of several mortgagees may recover the damages he has separately
sustained. Id.
4. Damages from failure of tenant to keep and return the premises in good
order, are due from the date of demand by the lessor. Bourdette v. Board of
School Directors, 414.
5. The right to such damages arises ex contractu, and the prescription appli-
cable to actions ex delicto does not arise. Id.
6. Evidence of the value of plaintiff's practice as a physician for five years
previous to the injury, held admissible to aid the jury in estimating the amount
to be awarded. Loqansoort v. Justice, 797, and note.
7. EXEMPLARY DAMAGES, 570.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. See CotrosATioN, 12. FRAUD. HUSBANDAND WIFE, 20, 23-25, 29, 34, 35. P.RTNERSIIP, 9, 10. POWzn, 1. SPE-
CIFIC PERFORMANCE, 1.
1. Moneys given by a married woman to her husband in 1855, and for
which she received no evidence or security until 1877, when he had become in-
solvent: Held, not to susram as against his existing creditors a transfer ef
property to her in 1877. Luers v. Brunjes, 762.
2. Prosecution of claims to judgment, cannot diminish the rights of a
zreditor to a distributive share of the proceeds from the debtor's property sold
under a deed in trust. Dodge et al. v. Sfanhope, 759.
3. Settlement of accounts with one creditor will not be set aside in favor of
another without clear proof of fraud or mistake. Klauber v. Wright, 759.
4. A sale is fraudulent in law, unless there is a change of possession ; such
as would indicate to an observer a change of ownership, exclusive, not joint,
Weeks v. Prescott, 629.
INDEX.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.
5. When the purchaser of personal property acquires the title to the land on
which it is situated, it is not necessary to remove it; aliter, it" he permits the
vendor to remain upon the premises, and control the property. Weeks v. Prea
cott, 629.
6. During the pendency of bankruptcy proceedings, the creditors accepted
the proposition of compromise, under the United States statute of 1874, and
the property was sold by the owner by leave of court. Held, that it was not a
judicial sale, and that the rule as t(. a change of possession applied. Id.
7. Here were two sales : 1st, from the vendor to his brother, and then by
the vendee to a son of the vendor. The first sale was fraudulent in law ; the
second, both in law and in fact. Held, that the second vendee took only the
rights of the first. Id.
8. It was a sale of a stock of goods in a country store. The vendor re-
mained in possession as agent of the vendee, selling and replenishing tile stock
with the avails of what was sold. Reld, that the goods remaining of those
originally purchased by the first vendee, were attachable; but those replaced.
were not attachable on the debts of the vendor. Id.
9. Taking a lease of the store in which the goods were situated, and having
it recorded ; the transfer of the policy of insurance to the vendee; opening
new books of account; buying and having goods sent in the name of the
vendee-these are facts that tend to show a sufficient possession. But they are
outweighed by the facts, that the vendor continued in the control and manage-
ment of goods, apparently as before the sale ; that the vendee continued to board
in his father's (vendor's) family as before ; that the goods remained in the
same store, and that to a common observer the apparent possession did not
indicate a diflerent possession. Id.
10. The evidence necessary to show a change in the possession of property
transferred by an uncle to his nephews, living together would be different from
that otherwise needed ; and where there is uncertainty, the question is for the
jury. McLaeughlin v. Lange, 214.
11. One who takes a voluntary conveyance of property knowing that the
grantor is unable to pay his debts without it, is guilty of fraud against the
creditors. Rrst Nttional Bank v. Beitschy, 552.
12. The fact that the grantee assumes to pay a subsisting mortgage of much
less than the value of the land, does not deprive the conveyance of its volun
tary character. Id.
13. Payment of higher interest than the usual rate, if made in pursuance
of a previous agreement, is not a fraud on creditors. Id.
14. A mortgage is not in fraud of creditors because given to secure an in-
valid promise. if the invalidity arises merely because the promise is-not in such
form or evidenced in such manner as the law requires. Id.
15. A previous loan to the debtor's son is not a valid consideration for a
conveyance as against creditors, unless the loan was made by direction of the
debtor and under circumstances raising a reasonable expectation that the debtor
would pay it. Id.
16. Where thero is a valuable consideration for a deed, but not sufficient to
uphold it as an absolute conveyance as against creditors, it will be treated in
equity as security for the sum advanced. Id.
17. Ante-nuptial settlement by insolvent man in consideration of marriage,
though intended by him to defraud creditors, is valid in the absence of fraud
on the wife's part: .Preurit v. WiLon, 491.
18. Voluntary conveyance to wife or child is void against creditors, even
though the balance of the debtor's property, is nominally greater than his in-
debtedness, if such conveyance cannot be made without hazard to his creditors.
Patterson v.' JMeKinney, 278.' - -
10. Mortgaged premises. were sold and a decree for deficiency taken against
the mortgagor. Thirteen days before subh sale, the mortgagor conveyed all
his lands, valued at $50,000, to his sons, one of theni-a minor, in satisfaction
of an alleged indebtedness of $8000. fHeld, fraudulent as against the mort.
gagee. Bank v. Beckman, 277. .
* 20. One only contingently liable ona contract is a debtor within the mean-
ing of; the Statute of Frauds, from the date of the contract; zhmidt v. Opie,
278.
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21. A judgment-creditor seeking the aid of equity in respect to his debtor's
personal estate, must show not only a judgment, but that an execution has been
issued. Schmidt v. Opie, 278.
22. Mere inquiry by a creditor to discover whether it would be more for his
advantage to approve or contest an assignment for creditors is not an induce-
ment to others to act upon it. Hubbard v. McNaughton, 414.
23. The fraudulent character of an assignment does not depend on the as-
signor's opinion that what he does is not fraud in law. Id.
24. Such assignment is fraudulent if property is withheld or excessive liens
placed on it. Id.
25. A general assignment which stipulates for a release by the creditors, is
invalid. Id.
DECEDENTS' ESTATES. See CONFLICT OF LAWS, 3, 4. DONATIO MORTIS
CAUSA. EXECUTORS AND -DMINISTRATORS. LEGACY. PARTNERSHIP, 8.
WILL.
DEED. See AGENT, 15. EQUITY, 13. EVIDENCE, 1, 5, 21-23. LUNATIC, 2.
PARTNERSHIP, 13.
1. Verbal admissions inadmissible to modify or vary. illorrill v. Robinson,
276.
2. The grantor is estopped by the consideration clause from deny considera-
tion. Id.
3. Fee-simple conveyance cannot contain conditions against alienatioa and
liability for debts, and it makes no diff rence that the conveyance is to one for
life and another in remainder. lcCleary v. Ellis, 180.
4. Conditions in restraint of alienation discussed. Id., note.
5. Calls for adjoiners govern rather than courses and distances. Koch v.
Dunkel, 74.
6. In cases of ambiguity, articles of agreement, in pursuance of which the
deed was made, may be admitted in evidence. Id.
7. In a description, the fixed monuments are more to be relied on than the
courses and distances, and the fact that the government has established a fixed
standard for measurement of distances, cannot affect this rule. Ealbfeisds v.
Oil Co., 622.
8. Where premises were described as lot 4, and there was an original lot
and a sub-lot both numbered 4, but the description of the buildings thereon
showed that the sub-lot was intended. Held, that the description was sufficient
to render the record of the deed notice. Bowen v. Galloway, 414.
9. It is not necessary that land shall be called by any particular name; it is
sufficient if the description is such as to identify the property. Id.
10. Where the description is by mistake so defective that the property can-
not be identified, the deed is not notice, nor can it be reformed as agaust a
bona fide purchaser. Id.
DELIVERY. See CORPORATION, 13. SALE, 13. WAREHOUSEMAN, 6.
DEMURRER. See CRIMINAL LAW, 6, 9. TRADE-MARK, 6.
DESCENT. See CONFLICT OF LAWS, 3, 4.
DEVISE. See WILL, 3-1.
DIVORCE. See HUSBAND AND WIPE, I.
DOMICILE. See CONFLICT OF LAWS, 3, 4.
DONATIO MORTIS CAUSA.
One C. in anticipation of his own death sold a carriage, the price to be paid
in farm produce to his wife. Held, that his widow and not his executor vvas
entitled to the produce. Scruggs v. Alexander, 489.
DOWER. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, II.
DRAFT. See ACCEPTANCE. BILLS and NOTES, 4.
DURESS. See PAYMENT, 1. TAXATION, 3.
1. Note and mortgage given by a father under threats to prosecute his son,
may be avoided on the ground of duress. Harrisv. Carmody, 663, anm nte.
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2. Such defence need not be specially pleaded to a complaint to recover the
mortgaged premises. Harris v. Cannody, 663, andnote
DUTIES. See STATUTE, 3.
EASEMENT.
1. Cannot be created by parol. Banghart v. Flummerfelt, 699.
2. Action at law will not lie on parol unwritten agreement with a former
owner of plaintiff's mill, to erect on nis own land a dam and aqueduct, and to
keep up the same. Id.
EJECTMENT. See HOMESTEAD.
One in actual possession cannot maintain ejectment against a person not in
possession. Carmichael v. Argard, 553.
EMBEZZLEMENT. See CRIMINAL LAW, IV.
EMINENT DOMAIN. See DAMAGES, 1.
ENCUMBRANCE. See INCUMRANCE.
EQUITY. See ACTION, 1. AMENDMENT, 2. CORPORATION, 11. COSTS, 4.
EiRORS AND APPEALS, 14. INSURANCE, 3, 7. MESNE PROFITS. NUI-
SANCE, I. POWER, 1. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. TAXATION, 2.
1. Will interfere by injunction in favor of one claiming under unrecorded
deed to prevent sale under deed of trust held by one who took it with notice.
Martin v. Jones, 420.
2. Bringing suit against only one of several persons to recover an entire
sum received by him under a constructive trust, but divided with others,
should preclude separate suits against the rest. German American Seminary v.
Kiefer, 489.
3. Equity will not interfere to enforce merely constructive trust after long
delay. Id.
4. Equity will not encourage the splitting of causes of action. Id. I
5. An equitable action of assumpsit, if it lies at all, will be outlawed by the
same lapse of time as bars an action at law. Id.
6. Agreement to admit person to medical institute and assist in his gradu-
ation in consideration of his abandoning a fictitious name similar to that of the
other party who is a member of the faculty, is of such doubtful propriety that
equity will not enforce it. Olin v. Bate, 415.
7. Nor will an injunction be granted to restrain the use of such name in a
city, when it appears that defendant had used the name before complainant
came to the city. Id.
8. The rule that where a creditor has a lien upon two funds, in one of which
the debtor has no interest, he must first exhaust the latter, does not apply if
other persons have a superior equity in that fund. Baird v. Jackson, 415.
9. Bill will not be sustained to remove alleged cloud on title when the in-
validity of the instrument constituting such cloud is apparent on its face, nor
when the invalidity of a tax title is involved and there is no offer to" pay the
tax. Briggs v. Johnson, 354.
10. Will not relieve for mistake or ignorance caused by plaintiff's gross
negligence. Conner v. Welch, 353.
11. Contract will not be set aside because of ignorance of the law, nor
because of statement of defendant's attorney as to the law if such statement
was not relied on. Dailey v. Jessup, 489.
12. Where a creditor's claim against the debtor's estate was retained until a
few days before the expiration of the time for notice, and then accidentally
delayed in the mail beyond such time, the court cannot relieve on the ground
that the creditor, through misreading his own entry, fell into error as to the
time. Ellison v. Lindsley, 338.
13. Cannot reform deed in absence of fraud, accident or mistake. Grubb's
Appeal, 74.
14. Cannot enjoin one having a right to dig ore from taking more than his
contract calls for. Id
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15. Nor decree an account in a mere matter of charge for a certain number
of tons of ore. Grubb's Appeal, 74.
16. Bill to set aside judgment on ground that complainant's attorney was
engaged in another court, and that the opposite attorney fraudulently presented
only part of a record, not sustained where the charges of fraud were general
and no injury is shown to have resulted from the omission. Dinet v. Eigen-
mann, 74.
17. An answer under oath, though denying fraud, is insufficient to overcome
the testimony of two witnesses if it also contain admissions of facts from which
fraud follows as a legal conclusion. Bank v. Beckman, 278.
18. Sale under a decree cannot be attacked collaterally by setting up, that
the solicitor who acknowledged service of the subpena had no authority, -nor
that the ticket accompanying the subpoena did not apprise the defendant of the
ground of complaint. Dickinson v. City of Trenton, 276.
19. BILLS TO QUIET PossEssioN AND TITLE, 561.
ERRORS AND APPEALS. See BANKRuPTCY, 1. BILL OF EXCEPTIONS.
COSTS, 1. CRIMINAL LAW, 4, 9, 17. EVIDENCE, 6. RECEIVER, 1. U. S.
COURTS, 4, 14-19.
1. A writ of error to the Supreme Court of the United States, issued from
the Supreme Court of a state, is void, as not being in conformity with sect.
1004 Rev. Stat., and cannot be amended under sect. 1005. Bondurant v. WVat-
son, 554.
2. It is doubtful whether under the Act of 1872, Rev. Stat. 914, cases tried
in the U. S. Circuit Courts by a referee in states where such a practice exists
can be reviewed in the Supreme Court. Boogher v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 622.
3. Treating such a case as if tried by the court without a jury, the finding
of facts by the referee is conclusive. Id.
4. Although the record does not show the written stipulation of the waiver
of a jury required by the Act of 1865, Rev. Stat. 649, 700, yet if it appears
that under the state practice, the case could not have been referred without
the written consent of the parties, the appellate court will assume that a
written stipulation was filed. Id.
5. Where the exceptions to a referee's report are overruled as a whole, and
one exception is taken to the action of the court overruling them, this exception
will not be sustained, if any one of the findings of the referee excepted to was
correct: Id.
6. Certiorari lies at common law, first, where it is shown that the inferior
court has exceeded its jurisdiction ; and second, where such court has proceeded
illegally, and no appeal or writ of error lies. Hyslop v. Knch, 698.
7. It simply brings before the court the record of the inferior tribunal, and
its judgment affects the validity of the record alone. Id.
8. Extrinsic evidence may be received to show that no injustice has been
done; or that for any good reason, the writ ought not to be granted. But
when the record is before the court on the return of the writ, the court will look
only at the record. Id.
9. Mere lapse of time, short of the limitation for prosecuting a writ of error,
will not bar the issuing of the common law certiorari. Id.
10. The discharge of a receiver furnishes no ground of appeal. Nor does
the rescission of an interlocutory order of sale, which determined no right.
Washington City, 4-c., Railroad Co. v. Southern Railroad Co., 810.
11. When the instruction given by the court was correct and sufficient, the
appellate court will not reverse for a fallure to give other instructions aske
for, even though the latter would have been also correct. Recknagie v.
Murphy, 415.
12. Appeal maybe taken from joint salvage award for more than $5000,
although the amount apportioned to some of the joint salvors was less than
that sum. Sinclair v. Cooper, 490.
13. Where several causes have been litigated by all of the defendants out of
a common fund, the appellate court will not accept the submission of one of
them against the wishes of the others. St. Louis S. &- Railroad Co. v. Kemp,
354.
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14. Under sect. 1012 Rev. Stat. the Supreme Court may adjudge damages
for delay on appeals as well as on writs of error, and this power is not confined
to money judgments. Gibbs v. Diekma, 354.
15. When accounts are stated by the auditor to represent the claims of the
respective parties under their instructions, such accounts may be reviewed on
appeal though no exception was taken. Walter v. Foutz, 354.
16. A decree authorizing the comptroller-general to take charge of a railroad
but not finally settling his rights as against creditors of the road, is not a final
decree to which a writ of error will lie. Hand v. Hagood, 354.
17. 'rroneous instruction favorable to losing party no ground for reversal.
Andrews v. Conger, 328.
18. Objection as to the time of the production of evidence will not be reviewed
on appeal. Crenshaw v. Slye, 354.
19. Appellate court will not reverse for refusal of several propositions pre-
sented as a whole, if either of them was erroneous. United Statesv. Hough, 210.
20. An exception to the admission of irrelevant testimony is cancelled, when
the court, before the final submission of the ease, instructs the jury to dis-
regard such evidence. Pennsylvania Co. v. Boy, 245.
21. The finding of facts by the court in an admiralty case, will have the
effect of a verdict of a jury. Steamship Benefactor v. Mount, 274.
22. In case of a trial by submission without a jury, exceptions to the judg-
ment of the court upon the facts, will not be considered by the appellate court.
Bank v. Winslow, 138.
23. An order imposing a fine for contempt in disobeying an injunction, is not
reviewable on writ of error. Hayes v. FYscher, 209.
24. The fact that the bond contains no security for costs does not necessarily
avoid the appeal, but the court may impose terms on the appellants for the
omission. Seward v. Comean, 276.
ESCHEAT. See COSTS, 5.
ESTOPPEL. See CORPORATION, 2, 9, 11. CRIMINAL LAw, 26. DED, 2.
MUNICIPAL BONDS, 6, 7. NEGOTIABLE. INSTRUMENTS, 2. NUISANCE, 3.
RAILROAD, 4, 7. SPECIFIC PERFonMANCE, 3. VENDOR AND VENDEE, 2.
VESSEL, 3.
1. The obligors in a delivery bond, which recites a levy, are estopped in an
action on the bond from pleading that there was no levy. Hndley v. Phil-
bert, 810.
2. A grantee taking subject to a mortgage is estopped, as against the mort-
gagor, from acquiring title under a tax levy caused by his own default. Leppo
v. Gilbert, 760.
3. Such title would be void in the hands of a subsequent purchliser, without
other notice than the record of the mortgage and conveyance and the posses-
sion by his grantor. Id.
4. One who acts as secretary of school trustees of a township for eleven years
is estopped from denying the legality of their election. Frick v. Trustees of
Schools, 700.
5. An obligor on a bond, who has availed himself of the benefit of a stay
law passed by a seceding state, is estopped from setting up its invalidity.
Daniels v. Tearney, 416.
6. Where a party permits his name to be affixed over another's place of busi-
ness, he is liable to those giving credit. Lochte v. Gde, 416.
7. Estoppel may be worked by actions as well as words. Id.
8. To estop an owner of land from asserting his title, an intention to deceive,
or negligence so gross as to amount to constructive fraud, must be shown.
Kingman: v. Graham, 355.
9. If his title is recorded, he is not estopped by silence, unless directly
apprised that the person dealing with him is about to act in ignorance of his
title. fd.
10. Misrepresentation by an agent to new officers of a company as to the
terms of his contract of employment, will not estop him from afterwards setting
up the real contract. Alliance Ins. Co. v. McKnight, 210.
ESTREPEMENT." Seb MALIcIOUs PROSECUTION, 2.
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EVIDENCE. See AGENT, 3. BILLS AND NOTES, 34. BOND, 3. CoxxoN
CARRIER, 8. CRI3INAL LAw, 2, 5, 6, 16, 19-23, 34. DA-MGES, 6. DEED,
1, 6. FOREIGN JUDGMENT, 2. FOREIGN LAW. HUSBAND AND WIFE, 1,
24, 25, 33. LImITATIONS, STATUTE OF, 3. MASTER AND SERVANT, 12.
MORTGAGE, 13. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 13. NEGLIGENCE, 1, 3. NEw
TRIAL, 1. SALE, 3. TELEGRAPH. VENDOR AND VENDEE, 3. WITNESS.
1. Declarations by grantor subsequent to the deed are inadmissible against
the grantee. Dodge v. Stanhope, 760.
2. Where two are sued as partners, the statements of one in the absence
of the other are not evidence of the partnership as against the latter. Johnston
v. Clements, 490.
3. The admission by a party of the existence of an assessment, under the
provisions of a municipal charter authorizing it, will render unnecessary proof
of the validity or regularity of such assessment. Turrell v. City of Eliza-
beth, 623.
4. A plaintiff, whose success depends on the admission of evidence offered
by defendant, cannot complain that the court has made use of that evidence so
far as it was favorable to defendant. Id.
5. Deed by two grantors is admissible in evidence, although the certificate
of acknowledgment is defective as to one of them. Peoples' Baunk v. Wins-
low, 210. '
6. 'Courts generally take judicial notice of the public officers, and, in some
cases, their signatures; and when the trial court acts upon such judicial notice
the appellate court will presume that it acted properly. Malcott v. Gibbs, 210.
7. When the wife is the substantial party to a suit, her husband is not a
competent witness. Evidence of the circumstances under which an assault
was committed is admissible, either in aggravation or in mitigation of damages.
If there are no circumstances of malice or oppression, compensatory damages
only can be recovered, and if such damages only are asked, the motive of the
defendant is wholly immaterial. Joice v. Branson, 811.
8. Where the question is whether a machine purchased failed through defect
in its construction or in consequence of mismanagement, it is material error
for the court to permit testimony that some other machine furnished by the
same manufacturer similarly failed. Craver v. Homburg, 764.
9. Where the whole of an offer is objected to, it is error to exclude it if any
part of it is admissible; but in such case it must appear that some part is
clearly admissible. Eckenrode v. Chemical Co., 810.
10. Objection to depositions that they were taken without notice should be
made by motion to suppress before trial. H=olman v. Bachus, 811.
11. The question as to the time of a material alteration on the face of a
written instrument is one for the jury. Neil v. Case, 554.
12. Where a written contract is uncertain parol evidence of the situation of
the parties and of the subject-matter is admissible, and in such case the con-
struction subsequently put upon it by the parties themselves, as evinced by
their conduct, may be shown. Wilson v. Morse, 491.
13. When a telegram is offered in evidence, the original must be prQduced, or,
in case of its loss, the next best evidence the case will admit of must be
furnished. Barous v. Brown, 490.
14. Testimony of operator as to entries in book not made by him held in-
sufficient to prove such telegram. Id.
15. Books kept by telegraph company inadmissible, except to refresh recol-
lection of person making the entries. Id.
16. Certificate of acknowledgment cannot be impugned by mere denial
under oath by the party, opposed by equally strong evidence in support of the
certificate. Johnson v. Van Velsor, 490.
17. Foreign statutes should be proved as provided for in the state laws and
acts of Congress rather than by the testimony of a lawyer. Kopke v. The
People, 490.
18. A printed copy of state statutes purporting to be published by authority
is admissible in evidence. Harryman v. Roberts, 373.
19. The signature of a court clerk to a certificate need not contain his full
Christian name. Id.
20. Where a bill is filed in aid of execution, and the purchaser of land i.
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made a defendant, his neglect to make an affirmative showing to support the
sale will warrant a court in giving their full force to any legitimate inferences
from the evidence given against it. Wldtney v. Rose, 417.
21. Testimony of grantor alone not sufficient to overcome the proof of the
execution of a deed afforded by the certificate of its acknowledgment. Baird
v. Jackson, 417.
22. The acts and conduct of one who claims that a deed purporting to be his
is a forgery, done before he had knowledge of the deed, cannot be used to con-
Iyadict his testimony. Id.
23. Where a joint deed is claimed by both grantors to be a forgery, proof of
the forgery as to one raises a presumption as to the forgery of the other, and
is admissible as part of the res gestm. Id.
24. If the party who made book entries received the items from another, that
other should testify to their correctness, or satisfactory proof thereof should be
produced in addition to the entries. Stettaner v. Wldte, 416.
25. In a suit for breach of contract to buy an account of the plaintiff, he is
bound to prove his account as in a suit upon the account itself. Id.
26. Certain evidence held insufficient to prove such account. Id.
27. The proviso to section 858 Rev. Stat. that in actions by or against exe-
cutors, &c., neither party shall be allowed to testify, does not exclude those who
are not parties, but who have an interest in the issue. Petter v. Bank, 277.
28. The federal courts do not follow the rules of evidence prescribed by a
state when such rules are in conflict with the Revised Statutes. Id.
29. In questions of private boundary, declarations of particular facts made
by deceased persons are not admissible unless made by persons shown to have
had knowledge, or by persons on or in possession of the land while pointing
out the boundaries. Hunnicut v. Peyton, 75.
30. Witnesses are not allowed to give opinions unless they are experts, and
then only upon questions of science and skill. Monroe v. Lattin, 626.
31. When an expert is testifying to handwriting from comparison of hands,
he should have before him in court the writings compared. Hynes v. McDer-
mott, 44.
32. Photographic copies of originals not produced are not admissible as
foundation for a comparison of hands. Id.
33. Any person acquainted with the handwriting may give his opinion, and
the acquaintance need not be from seeing the person write, but if the standards
upon which he formed his opinion were selected by or in the interest of the
party calling him, he is incompetent. Id.
34. Books professing to contain the laws of a foreign country, but not pub-
lished by the government thereof or under its express sanction, are not evi-
dence. Id.
35. Presumptions as to continuance of state of facts proved to have existed
at a time anterior to that in question (as e. g. the statute law of a foreign state)
discussed. Id.
EXECUTION. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 11. ESTOPPEL, I. FIXTURE, 3.
G.OWING CROPS. HUSBAND AND WIFE, 20, 30. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION,
2. PARTNERSHIP, 2. REPLEVIN, 1, 6. SALE. SHERIFF. SUERIFF's
SALE.
i. At common law a writ of execution is not abated by the death of the
judgment-creditor, and the officer is not liable in trespass for serving it. Wing
v. Hus.sey, 355.
2. Where no trespass is committed by the officer, the person directing the
service is not guilty of trespass. Id.
3. Statute exempting stock of mechanic, minor or other person used in
carrying on his business, applies to stock of goods on sale by a merchant.
Wicker v. Comstock, 491.
4. If the officer refuses to give the debtor an opportunity to make a selection
or denies his right to an exemption, the want of actual selection will not be a
waiver of the right. Id.
5. The word "householder" in the exemption laws includes a widower
whose children have arrived atfull age and have left his d6micile. Bunnell v.
Hays, 751, and note.
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6. Where one has only an adopted child, and employs a family to keep houe
for him, he is a householder. Bunnell v. Hayjs, 751.
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS. See ACTION, 6. ADmiRALTY, 13.
DONATiO MORTIS CAUSA.
1. Cannot invest trust funds in municipal bonds or bank stock. Tucker v.
Tucker, 355.
2. Where commissions are paid on part of the estate at an intermediate
accounting, they can only be allowed on the subsequent receipts, and must
be calculated as if the subsequent receipts were part of the prior receipts. Id.
3. Administrator withdrawing from deposit funds held to await the appear-
ance of a clistributee, is liable for interest at the legal rate. Matter of Dore-
mus's Estate, 355.
4. Administrator has no legal power to borrow money and pledge the pro-
perty of the estar., and a bill brought against him for the recovery of the
money out of the estate, and not joining the heirs, will be dismissed. Mer-
chants' Nat. Bank v. Weeks, 697.
5. Whether the money should be repaid from the estate, is a question for the
Probate Court upon a settlement of the administrator's account. Id.
6. A decedent left no property but his wearing apparel. His widow paid
the expenses of his last sickness and of his burial, and gave to his brother a
suit of his clothes of less value than the amount thus paid. Held, that she
was not liable as executrix in her own wrong. Taylor v. .Mcore, 75.
EXEMPTION. See EXECUTION, 3-6.
EXPERT. See CONTRACT, 13. EVIDE E, 30, 31
EXPRESS COMPANY. See RAILROAD, 2-4
FALSE IMPRISONMENT. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 6. MALICIOLS PROSZ-
CUTION, 4.
FALSE PRETENCE. See CRIMNAL LAW, V
FENCE.
When built on the land of another without agreement as to removal, may be
removed and disposed of by the owner of the land. Kimball v. Adams, 760.
FERRY. See Com"oN CARRIER, 13, 14
FIXTURE. See GROWING CRoPs.
1. The requisites of a fixture are 1. Actual annexation. 2. Application to
the use to which the realty is appropriated. 3. The intention. Ward v. Kil-
patrick, 785, and note.
2. Mirror-frames set in hall and parlor, and intended to be permanently
attached, Held, to be part of the realty, and the proper subject of a mechanic's
lien. Id.
3. Wooden building resting partly on the ground and partly on posts set into
the ground, and intended to be permanently used as a dancing-hall in connee
tion with an adjoining saloon, Held, as against an execution creditor, to be
part of the realty. Lipsky v. Borgman, 760.
4. Machinery specially adapted for use in connection with the realty, is a
fixture, no matter how designated by the parties. Lyle v. Paltzer, 277.
5. The water-wheel and gearing of a mill are fixtures. Lapham v. Norton,
277.
6. A mill built upon land in possession of the builder, and under a verbal
contract for its purchase, becomes a part of the realty, and the same result
follows though built for a third person, with the understanding that such third
person will take the premises upon certain conditions. Id.
7. A person in possession, under a verbal contract of purchase, is not liable
for rent, and improvements made while such contract is in force are not made
by him as tenant. Id.
FOREIGN JUDGMENT. See Fogs-xR AD.SuDICATION, 3. JURISDICTION.
1. Does not merge the cause of action, and assumpsit will lie upon the same
cause. Bank v. Beebe, 404.
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2. Such judgment is of no higher nature than the cause of action on which it
was obtained, and is onlyprinafacie evidence of indebtedness. Bank v. Beebc,
404.
FOREIGN LAW. See EvIDENCE, 17, 18, 34. STATUTE, 4. SUNDAY, 2.
How to be proved and interpreted. Note to Harrnan v. Roberts, 377.
FORFEITURE. See INSURANCE, 3, 11. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, 4.
FORGERY. See CORPORATION, 9, 10. CRIMINAL LAW, VI. EVIDENCE, 22,
23.
FORMER ADJUDICATION. See AoENT, 16. JOINT DEBTORS. PARENT
AND CHILD, 3.
1. Tile dismissal of a previous bill for want of a replication to a plea is a bar
to relief. The presumption that the plea went to the merits, is not overthrown
by mere averment in second bill that there had been no adjudication on the
merits. Leary v. Long, 138.
2. Order of bankruptcy court awarding damages for taking of land by bank-
rupt railroad, no bar to suit by landowner for the recovery of the land. Burnes
v. St. Louis, K. C. 4" N. Railroad Co., 138.
3. A judgment against a defendant in one state is a bar to a suit on the same
cause of action in another, if the first court had jurisdiction. Barryman v.
Roberts, 373.
4. If the subject-matter was the same a difference in the form of action is not
material. Id.
5. Such judgment is not invalidated by the fraudulent consent of the defend-
ant to the dismissal of his motion to set it aside. Id.
FRANCHISE. See INJUNCTION, 2. RAILROAD, 1. UNITED STATES COURTS,
13.
FRAUD. See ARBITRATION, 4, 5. BANxitUPTey, I. BILLS AND NOTES, 7.
CORPORATION, 12. DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 1, 4-19, 23-25. HUSBAND
AND WIFE, 23. MORTGAGE, 15. SALE, 15. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, 1.
Proof that a conveyance was made by an indebted wife to her husband, is
not in itself sufficient to prove fraud when met by their testimony, that there was
a valuable consideration, and that they were ignorant of the existence of the
claim of the attacking creditor. Tyberandt v. Rancke, 75.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF. See BILLS AND NOTES, 24. DEBTOR AND CRZD-
ITOR, 20.
While the form of the written memorandum required by the statute is not
material, it must state the contract with reasonable certainty, so that the sub-
stance can be made to appear from it without having recourse to parol proof.
Reid v. Kenworthy, 554.
GARNISHMENT. See ATTACHMENT, 2, 3.
GENERAL AVERAGE. See INSURANCE, 8.
GIFT. See DONATIO MORTIS CAUSA.
Voluntary conveyance of furniture and articles to wife by letters, is not such
a declaration of trust as will prevent their forming part of the husband's residu-
ary estate. In re Breton's Estate, 811.
GROWING CROPS. See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 9. MORTGAGE, 11.
Crops matured and ready for harvest although not severed, are personal chat-
tels, and do not pass by sheriff's deed upon foreclosure sale. Hecht v. Ditt-
man, 615, and note.
GUARANTY. See BILLS AND NOTES, 12, 19, 20, 25, 26, 28. NATIONAL BANK,
1, 3. SURETY. WAREHOUSEMAN, 1.
1. When conditional must be accepted and guarantor notified of its accept.
ance. King v. Batterson, 624.
2. If the goods were furnished by some other persons than the one to whom
the guarantee was addressed, such persons cannot recover on the ground that
the party to whom it was addressed was their agent. Id.'
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3. "I, C. H., hereby agree to be responsible that L. shall faithfully perform
and keep this agreement," is a guaranty only, and L. and C. H. cannot be
jointly sued thereon. Snith v. Loomis, 811.
GUARDIAN AND WARD. See SUBROGATION.
Guardian held liable for note given by him to ward's mother and -after her
death taken into his own custody ostensibly for safe keeping, also for the pro-
ceeds of furniture belonging to the ward's mother and sold at auction by him.
McGull v. O' Connell, 356.
HABEAS CORPUS. See PARENT AND CHILD, 3.
HEIRS.
Rights of heirs during lifetime of ancestor. Noteto Bartle's Petition, 99.
HIGHWAY. See CRIMINAL LAW, 8. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 17-19, 26.
NEGIrGENCE, 4, 7, 8, 19. NuIsAxcE, 12.
HOMESTEAD. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 8, 9, 36, 37, 41.
Defendant in ejectment cannot claim, under the Homestead Act, land ex-
ceeding the statutory limit. Blandy v. Asher, 491
HOUSEHOLDER. See EXECUTION, 3, 6.
HUSBAND AND WIFE. See CONFLICT OF LAws, 1, 2. CRIMINAL LAW, 24.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 1, 17, 18. EvIDENCE, 7. FRAUD. GIFT. IN-
FANT, 1. IsOLvENCy. INsuRANCE, 7. PARENT AND CHILD, 2
I. Marriage, Divorce and Alimony.
1. Marriage may be proved by evidence of cohabitation, acknowledgment
and reputation. Hynes v. M1cDermott, 44.
2. Whether acts sufficient to constitute a marriage by the laws of New York,
done in a foreign state, by the laws of which they would not be sufficient, will
be held to constitute a valid marriage in New York, qucere? Id.
3. In the absence of evidence of the law of the foreign state, it will not be
presumed to be different from the law of the former. Id.
4. Whether a vessel on the high seas carries with it the marriage law of its
nationality, qucere? .1d.
5. Effect of conflict between ler domicilii and lex loci discussed. Id., note.
6. Condoned adultery may be revived by misconduct which falls short of
adultery. Ridgway v. Ridgway, 783. and note.
7. Where a divorced wife marries another man who is able to support her,
the first husband will be absolved from future alimony, but the decree will not
be made retroactive so as to cut off accrued alimony. Stillman v. Stillman,
667, and note.
8. Divorce obtained by wife will not deprive her of homestead rights in
land acquired during coverture, and on which she coninues to reside. .Blandy
v. Asher, 491.
9. In the absence of evidence of a new homestead, the place which was the
husband's homestead at the time of his abandonment of his family wili, for
the purpose of preserving their rights, be treated as his homestead. Id.
10. If a husband forces his wife from home by cruel and brutal treatment,
he deserts her. Skean v. Skean, 276.
11. But not if she leaves him merely because of his failure to furnish sup-
port. d.
12. Wilful misconduct of husband which endangers the health or life of wife,
exposes her to bodily hazard and intolerable hardship, and renders cohabitation
unsafe, is "cruel and inhuman treatment ;" and even a single act of that char-
acter may, under certain circumstances, warrant a divorce. Beyer v. Beyer, 138.
I. Curtesy and Dower.
13. While a wife's inchoate right of dower in her husband's estate may be
released during his life, it cannot be bargained and sold. Rezy v. Horst, 700.
14. Wife joining with the husband in a conveyance of his property in trust
for creditors, the deed providing that she should receive a portion of the pro-
ceeds in lieu of her right of dower, will be allowed such portion. Id.
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15. Statute of Limitations does not run against action for dower until ad-
verse possession by heirs or grantees. Fech v. rinch, 74.
16. Widow not entitled to improvements as against purchasers without knowl-
edge of marriage, and enhancement in value by reason of money spent in laying
out lots and securing the erection of a depot, is such an improvement. Id.
17. Widow is not obliged to pay taxes levied before assignment of dower.
Id.
II. Separate Estate.
18. The general engagements of a married woman cannot be enforced against
her separate estate to which she became entitled after the time of the engagements,
nor against separate estate to which she was entitled at the time of the engage-
ments subject to a restraint on anticipation. Pike v. Fitzgibbon, 812.
19. Under the Illinois law, a wife may own separate funds and invest them
in business without subjecting them to her husband's debts, and she may em-
ploy her husband to assist in such business. Cubberly v. Scott, 418
IV. Contracts, Canveyances, 4-c.
20. Husband may confess judgment in favor of his wife without a trustee,
and execution may issue thereon. Rose v. Latshaw, 76.
21. Contract of husband and wife to convey her land, is not within a statute
providing that" actions may be inaiutained against a married woman upon any
contract made by her since her marriage upon her personal credit for the benefit
of herself, her family or her separate or joint estate." Such contract is not
enforceable against both jointly nor against either alone. Gore v. Carl, 76.
22. Payments made to the husband upon such contract cannot affect the wife's
rights. Id.
23. Fraudulent conveyance to wife after creditor has lost his lien, may, after
revival of the lien, be attacked by the creditor. Bennett v. Stout, 418.
24. The fact that a wife employs her husband as her agent to cultivate her
farm and have the grain harvested, stored and sold, is not evidence that the
property belongs to thehusband, and will not render the farm products liable to
his debts. Id.
25. On bill to set aside a conveyance alleged to have been taken by the hus-
band in the name of the wife, the declarations of the husband and others made
in the absence of the wife, are not admissible. The same rule applies to the
declarations of the grantor in the deed. Id.
26. Money received by a husband from the sale of his wife's real estate made
before the adoption of the Maryland Code, belongs to him, unless he obtained
it by promising to repay it to his wife. Sabel v. Slingluff, 278.
27. A promise to make such repayment creates a debt which may be barred
by the Statute of Limitations. Id.
28. A bill to carry out the directions of a will for the sale of real estate,
with prayer for general relief, is not a creditor's bill and does not prevent the
running of the Statute of Limitations. Id.
29. Sale of chattels by husband to wife unaccompanied by delivery, cannot
be enforced at law under New Jersey statutes. Woodruff v. Apgar, 211.
30. Where such goods are seized on an execution against the husband,
replevin does not lie by the wife. Id.
31. Mere fact of cohabitation not sufficient to give wife implied authority to
pledge husband's credit for necessaries. Debenham v. Mellon, 316.
32. Extent of husband's liability upon wife's contract for necessaries. Id.,
note 324.
33. Defence by wife to note and mortgage duly executed, and acknowledged
that she executed them under coercion of her husband, can be sustained only
upon perfectly clear evidence. The unsupported testimony of the wife is
insufficient. Smith v. Allis, 492.
34. Conveyance in consideration of marriage, if bona.fide and reasonable, is
good against both existing and subsequent creditors. National Exchange Bank
v. Watson, 624.
35. To make an ante-nuptial settlement void against creditors, both parties
must have been cognisant of the fraud. .d.
VOL. XXIX--106
INDEX.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
36. Homestead right cannot be barred by ante-nuptial release. Mam v.
Mann's Estate, 700.
37. Ante-nuptial contract not to claim homestead can only be enforced in
equity, and will not be there enforced unless the husband has performed his
part of the agreement. Id.
38. The principle, that whatever title a grantee with covenants of warranty
subsequently acquires enures to the benefit of the grantor, does not apply to a
married woman joining in a deed with her husband. Goodenough v. Fellows,
762.
39. Not considered what might be held in equity respecting an after-acquired
title of the separate real estate of the wife, which she had once conveyed for a
full consideration with a general covenant of warranty. Td.
40. The right of distress by a landlady is not lost by an unauthorized agree-
ment by her husband to suspend it. Cahill v. Lee, 811.
41. Husband cannot lease homestead without wife's consent, where the lease
interferes with the enjoyment of the premises by the wife. Coughlen v. Cough-
len, 761.
IDEM SONANS. See NAME, 2.
IMPORTS. See STATUTE, 3.
PTCUMBRANCE. See COVENANT, 2. IxsurtNCE, 16. LIEN. MECRxC' S
LIEN. MORTGAGE.
INDICTMENT. See CRIMINAL LAW, 3, 9, 12, 29.
INFANT. See GUARDIAN AND WARD. PARENT AND CHILD. VENDOR AND
VENDEE, 6.
1. While under the Infants' Relief Act, a contract of marriage made by
minors cannot be ratified, yet the fixing of the wedding day after arrival at
age, is not merely a ratification but evidence of a fresh promise. Ditcham v.
Worrell, 447.
2. What acts amount to a ratification and what to a fresh promise. Id.,
note.
3. After an infant becomes of age, he cannot disaffirm his contract made
during infancy -without returning to the other party what he has received
under it and still possesses. Burgett v. Barrilc, 554.
4. The language "capable of contracting" in sect. 3, c. 67, p. 553, Comp.
Laws of Kansas 1879, is to be understood as "legally capable" and not
"mentally capable." Id.
5. In suit for money earned jointly by an infant and an adult, the infant's
father cannot sue with the adult in his own name. Osburn v. Farr, 211.
6. Joint maker of note with infant may be held as sole maker. Taylor v.
Dansby, 139.
INJUNCTION. See EQUITY, 1, 7, 14. JUDGMENT, 1. NUISANCE, 1-5. TAx-
ATION, 2.
1. Will usually be granted to prevent the erection of obstructions on a strip
of ground alleged to be a public way, but if there is an agreement between
complainant and respondent for the use of the strip of ground, the remedy
would be on the agreement. Gore v. Brubaker, 762.
2. An injunction to restrain an oil company from laying a pipe underneath
the drawbridge of a railroad company refused, because, 1. The pipe had been
laid before the application. 2. The lands where the pipe crossed the bridge
belonged to the state. 3. The pipe did not obstruct the operation of the draw-
bridge, and 4. The railroad company's franchise of carrying oil was not ex-
clusive. United N. J. R. R. 6- C. Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 279.
3. Where defendants, in opening a road through plaintiff's property, are cut-
ing his timber and exposing his crops to the depredations of stock, such injury
is irreparable, and an iniuncion will be granted without proof of defendant's
insolvency. .McPiae v. W1rest, 211.
4. Where one creditor cannot be injured by the dissolution of an injunction,
granted on the filing of a bill by creditors against a corporation; and its con-
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tinuance would defeat the plans for the reorganization of the corporation entered
into by the creditors, it will be dissolved. Wasinqton City Railroad Co. v.
Southerun 3d. Railroad Co., 810.
INNKEEPER.
1. Liable for safety of place provided by him for cattle. Hilton v. Adams
279.
2. In the absence of any notice to the contrary, the jury were warranted in
finding that the cattle were delivered to him as innkeeper. Id.
INSANITY. See LUNATIC. CRIMINAL LAW, 23.
INSOLVENCY. See BAxNRUsrTcY. CORPORATION, 12. DEBTOR AND CRED-
ITOR.
Insolvent law of Maryland not applicable to a married woman. Building
Association v. Schmidt, 762.
TNSURANCE. See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 7. VERDICT.
[. Generally.
1. A superintendent of the insurance department of a state may, as the
statutorv successor of an insurance company, become a party to a suit in another
state touching the assets of the company, and may, on account of his citizen-
ship, remove the case to the federal courts. Life Association of America v.
Rundle, 555.
2. Policies are not required to be in writing, and may be changed by parol.
Roger lWilliams Ins. Co. v. Carrington, 492.
II. Marine. See Infra, 8.
Ill. life.
3. Equity will not relieve against the forfeiture of a policy for non-payment
of interest on premium-note at stipulated time. Knickerbocker Life Insurance
Cc. v. Dietz, 279.
4. A company forwarding to its agent a policy, is not liable upon the death
of the assured before receipt of the policy and payment of premium. Giddings v.
Insurance Co., 76.
IV. Fire.
5. Where a statement of loss is required to be sworn to by the owner of the
property, a statement sworn to by the husband of the owner is insufficient.
Spooner v. Vermont Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 762.
6. The company does not waive the defects in the statement by proceeding to
a determination of the plaintiff's claim. Id.
7. Reformation of policy issued in name of wife on husband's property re-
fused after loss, there being no proof of fraud or mutual mistake. Doniol v.
Insurance Co., 760.
8. The law of general average is not a part of the risk incident to a fire
policy, even though the policy be on a vessel. Miners' Trans. Co. v. Fireman's
Ins. Co., 201.
9. A clause avoiding a policy if the premises should 
"
become vacant or
unoccupied." Held, not to apply where the insured and his family left home
for twelve days to visit a sick daughter, and engaged a person to go to the
house daily to look after it. Stupetski v. Ins. Co., 418.
10. Removal of goods without the consent of the company, to another building
which happens also to answer the description of the original building described
in the policy, renders the policy void. Harris v. Royal Canadian Ins. Co.,
211.
11. Where the policy provides that, in case of loss the holders shall state
unter oath that the property was contained in the building described in the
policy, the failure to make such statement will defeat a recovery. Id.
12. The fact that defendant received the premium for the -hole time would
not authorize a recovery, the policy being forfeited by plaintiff's acts. Id.
13. Where the replication in reply to a plea that subsequent insurances had
been taken out in violation of a condition, sets up notice of such subsequent
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policies, it is not necessary for defendant to prove the existence of such poliics.
Warbasse v. Ins. Co., 76.
14. Violation of conditions by the insured defeats the policy, though the
money, in case of loss, is payable to a third person. Id.
15. Certain warranties in the application held to be in the nature of con-
ditions subsequent, and held that a merely technical breach not increasing the
risk, would not defeat the policy, but that any substantial breach would.
Co v. German Amer. Ins. Co., 356.
16. A mechanic's lien held to be an incumbrance within the meaning cf a
warranty against incumbrances, and held that it was error to reject evidence
of such an incumbrance under an answer averring incumbrances generally.
Redmon v. Reenix Ins. Co., 357.
INTEREST. See DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 13. EXECUTORS AND ADMINIS-
TRATORS, 3. INSURANCE, 3. LEGACY, 1, 2. TAX, 4. USrRY.
1. Is not recoverable in an action for the loss of property destroyed through
negligence. DeSteiger v. The Hannibal 4- St. Joseph Railroad Co., 812.
2. On a debt which is to bear a certain rate of interest until maturity, the
same rate is to he allowed after maturity. Union Ins. for Sav. v. Boston, 190.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 9.
1. While in interpreting a statute regard should be had to the letter, yet
courts should also have regard to the evil sought to be remedied, which in this
case was the use of intoxicating liquors as a beverage. State v. Iolmes, 555.
2. Whatever is generally and popularly known as intoxicating liquor is
within the prohibition of the statute ; but whatever is generally known as
medicine, or an article for toilet, or for culinary purposes, is without the
statute, although containing alcohol. Id.
3. As to the articles intermediate between these two classes, the question
whether they are within or without the statute is for the jury. Id.
4. In an action for injury to estate by selling liquor to decedent, the fact
that he purchased and drank the liquor does not constitute contributory negli
gence which will bar recovery. Weymire v. Wolfe, 76.
INTOXICATION. See NEGLIGENCE, 20.
JOINT DEBTORS. See BILLS AND NOTES, 1. INFANT, 5, 6.
Effect of judgment against one of several joint debtors upon right of action
against the others. Note to Kendall v. Hamilton, 527.
JOINIDER OF ACTIONS. See CRIMINAL LAW, 3, 4, 29. TRADE-MARK, 7.
JOINT STOCK COMPANY. See UNITED STATES COURTS, 8.
JUDGMENT. See AGENT, 11, 12. ATTORNEY, 4. EQUITY, 16. FOREIGN
JUDGMENT. JOINT DEBTORS. HUSBAND AND WIFE, 20. SURETY, 4-6.
UNITED STATES COURTS, 19. VARIANCE.
1. Will not be enjoined on the ground that an appeal was prevented by tte
fraudulent conduct of complainants' own attorney, unless it appears that he
was damnified thereby. Dobbs v. St. Joseph Ins. Co., 492.
2. Where delay in entering judgment arises from the act of the court, with-
out laches on the part of the parties, the judgment may be entered nune pro tune.
Mfitchell v. Overman, 607, and note.
3. It is the duty of the court so to enter its judgment when justice can only
be done in that way. Id.
JUDICIAL SALE. See DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 6. EQUITY, 18. GROWING
CROPS. PARTITION. RAILROAD, 1. SHERiFf'S SALE. TAX, 10, 11.
JURISDICTION. See ADMIRALTY, 4, 12, 13. COURTS, 1, 2. NUISANCE, 4.
UNITED STATES COURTS, 1-5,11-13, 17, 18.
Personal service is not always necessary to give a court jurisdiction. Ser-
vice according to the law of the state where defendant resides is sufficient.
Har'yman v. Roberts, 373.
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;UROR AND JURY. See CRIMINAL LAW, 5, 6, 15.
1. Objection to a juror will not avail after verdict, without proof affirma-
tively that it was unknown at the trial. State v. Bowden, 357.
2. Juror not disqualified by having read newspaper reports which created
impressions that would require evidence to remove. State v. Greenwade, 556.
3. An opinion, not so fixed as to prevent a fair consideration of the case,
will not render juror incompetent. State v. Spaulding, 109.
4. Disqualification based on formation of opinion. Id., note.
.5. Whether individual members of a grand jury may be challenged for favor
before they are sworn, qucere? State v. Hamlin, 137.
6. Some authorities hold that the expression of an opinion by a grand juror
that the accused person is guilty is ground of challenge, but these generally
hold that the exception must be taken before the juror is sworn. Id.
7. The common law requires grand jurors to be good and lawful freeholders
and inhabitants of the county, and a disqualified grand juror may be challenged
before indictment found. Id.
8. If a disqualification discovered after indictment found, can be taken
advantage of, it must be one that is pronounced such by common law or statute
and one that absolutely disqualifies. Id.
9. Jurors cannot resort to any knowledge which they may have by reason of
their familiarity with any special business or occupation. Craver v. Hornburg,
764.
10. Verdict may be set aside in criminal case, if the court officer remained
in the room during the deliberations of the jury. People v. Knapp, 144.
II. FREEHOLD QUALIFICATIONS or JuRoRs, 436, 497.
LACHES. See ADMIRALTY, t0. CORPORATION, 11. JUDGMENT, 2. MoaT-
GAGE, 14.
LANDLORD AND TENANT. See DAMAGES, 4, 5. FIXTURES, 7. EUSBAND
AND WIPE, 41. MECHANIC'S LIEN.
1. When the declaration does not allege eviction of the plaintiff by the
defendant's grantee, nor the taking of anything from the premises leased, an
action on tile covenant for quiet enjoyment cannot be maintained. Ware v.
Lithgow, 357.
2. Recovery for use and occupation of leased premises cannot be had against
others than the lessee during the existence of the lease. Doty v. Gillett, 410.
3. Surrender of interests in real estate cannot be inferred from non user
alone. Id.
4. In an action for use and occupation against one of the lessees and a stranger,
supported by evidence that the defendants acted as co-partners, the latter may
show their actual relation, and that the stranger had agreed to pay what would
have been his proportion of the rent under the lease to his co-defendant. Id.
5. Whether the rule that the tenant is liable for rent after destruction of the
premises is in force in Kansas, quwre ? Whitaker v. Hawley, 624.
6. Where real and personal property are leased for a gross rental, the lessee
is entitled upon a total destruction by fire, to an abatement of the rent equal to
the proportionate rental value of the personalty. Id.
7. Where a lease contained a stipulation that the lessee shall insure for the
benefit of the lessor, Held, that when this provision became operative :he
agreement to pay rent ceased to have force. Id.
8. Where a landlord sends his tenant a permit to remain two years longer
free of charge, and the tenant remains without declining the terms, he will be
deemed to have accepted them and may be dispossessed without notice to quit.
Hulett v. Nugent, 212.
9. A creditor of a tenant who is cultivating upon shares, cannot by attach-
ment on growing crops deprive the landlord of his interest. Atkins v. Womel-
dorf, 212.
10. In replevin by a landlord for corn levied on as his tenant's, after the
tenant had left the farm, the question whether the tenant had abandoned the
farm is for the jury. Id.
11. Where a tenant for ypars holds over after the expiration of his lease
the landlord may treat him ua; a trespasser, or as a tenant for another year.
Clinton Wire Cloth'Co. v. Gardner, 701.
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LARCENY. See CRMINAL LAW, VII.
LEASE. See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 2, 7, 11.
LEGACY.
1. Exceptions to rule that interest does not commence to run until the expira.
tion of a year enumerated. Welsh v. Brown, 812.
2. A legacy of a specific sum, the interest payable to one for life with remain.
der to another, is not an exception to such rule. Id
LIBEL.
1. Declaration need not aver that the publication was made to any person;
it is enough to aver a publication in a newspaper. Sproid v. Pillsbury, 813.
2. On demurrer to a declaration for libel, the words must be construed in the
sense imputed to them by the plaintiff. Feder v. Herrick, 701.
3. Words having a tendency to bring a person into ridicule, hatred or con.
tempt, are actionable if written or published. Id.
4. Caution against imputing in the pleading a meaning to words which the
facts will not sustain. Id.
LICENSE. See MuNicIPAL CORPORTION, 22, 24.
LIEN. See ATTORNEY, 3. MEcHANIc's LIEN. MORTGAGE, 6, 7. VENDOR
AND VENDEE, 1.
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 7, 8. DAxAGES
5. EQUITY, 5. HUSBAND AND WIFE, 15, 27, 28. TAX, 6.
1. In actions for relief for fraud or mistake, the cause of action does not
accrue until discovery. City of LouLwille v. Anderson, 687.
2. Does not run against each item of open mutual accounts, but only against
the balance due, from the date of the last proper credit. lVaffle v. Short, 619.
3. The words "I think I see my way clear to pay you the $200 and interest
I owe you. ** * I amin hopes another two years will enable me, from my
present income, to clear off all pressing debts. * * * Rest assured that not a
day of pecuniary freedom will pass over my head without your hearing from
me," held not sufficient to prevent the bar of the statute. Pierce v. Seymour,
493.
4. To prevent the bar of the statute, credits endorsed on a note must be
shown to have been made at a time when it was against the interest of the
holder to make them, or to have been made with the consent of the payor.
Goddard v. Williamson, 492.
5. Where a surety procures a payment to be made out of the funds of the
principal, such payment has the same effect to arrest the running of the statute
as a payment by the surety himself. McConnell v. Merrill, 702.
6. Debt barred by, cannot be revived in Wisconsin except by an unqualified
promise to pay in writing signed by the debtor. Pierce v. Seynour, 763.
7. Entry of owner upon part of tract stops the running of the statute in
favor of an intruder, except as to portion in latter's actual possession. Hunni-
cut v. Peyton, 76.
LUNATIC. See CRIMINAL LAw, 23.
1. An exchange of property by a lunatic whose lunacy is apparent, is of no
validity, and a subsequently appointed guardian may recover back the lunatic's
property without tendering that received by him. Haley v. Troester, 418.
2. Grantor in deed may avoid it by proof of his insanity, and offer to put
grantee in statu quo, is not a condition precedent. Crawford v. Scovel, 61.
But see note to Id. 65.
3. Whether the grantee can recover the consideration paid depends upon tho
circumstances of the case. Id. -
4. The lunatic in such case may sue in his own name and not by committee.
Id.
MAIL. See EQUITY, 12.
I. Where time of presenting claim to assignee for creditors is limited by
statute, the mere act of mailing such claim in time to reach the assignee, is not
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a sufficient presentment if the notice is accidentally delayed in the mail beyond
the time limited. Ellison v. Lindsley, 338.
2. Law as to sending notices by mail. Id. Note.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.
1. Does not lie unless there has been both malicious use of, and absence of
probable cause for, the legal process. Eberly v. Rupp, 77.
2. It cannot be founded on the nse of a writ of estrepement. Id.
3. No defence to show that the affidavit made by the prosecutor was insuffi-
cient legally to authorize the arrest. Stocking v. Howard, 813.
4. In al action for false imprisonment, an answer justifying under an order
of arrest is insufficient, if by such answer it appears that the affidavit on which
the order was granted did not state any one of the grounds required by statute
to be stated. Hauss v. Kohlar, 625.
MANDAMUS. See MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 3. SCHOOL, 1. U. S. COURTS,
10.
1. Should not be granted to compel levy of tax to pay bonds whose validity
is contested, until the relator has established his right in an action at haw.
State v. 3fayor, A-c., of Mfanitowoc, 625.
2. Will not be issued to an inferior tribunal to reverse its decision, refusing
a motion for an attachment against a witness who has disobeyed a subpena
duces tecum. Ex parte Burtis, 556.
MARSHALLING OF ASSETS. See EquiTy, 8. MORTGAGE, 7. PATNER-
sits?, 9, 10, 22-24.
MASTER AND SERVANT.
1. Action lies by employer against third person for procuring breach of con-
tract for personal sdrvice, even though the parties do not stand in the strict re-
lation of master and servant. Bowen v. Hall, 578.
2. Remedies of master against person enticing away servant. Id. Note.
3. A servant is liable to a fellow-servant for injury caused by the former's
negligence in leaving tools in a dangerous position. Osborne v. Morgan, 399.
4. In suit by servant against a master for injuries caused by incompetency of
fellow-servant, proof of such incompetency does not impose on defendant the
burden of proving that he used ordinary care in the selection of the servant.
21urphy v. St. Louis 4- 1. L. R. Co., 212.
5. The fact that the duties of a railroad employee were to direct and control
assistant brakemen at a particular yard, does not constitute him a vice-principal
so as to make the company-liable for his negligence towards one of the assistant
brakemen. Rains v. St. Louis L 3f. ,S. Railroad Co., 139.
6. A master must use reasonable care to provide safe implements and keep them
in good order. Porter v. Hannibal 6- St. Joseph Railroad Co., 139.
7. A servant entering into service, knowing of defects in machinery, takes
the risk. Id.
8. He is not bound to search for latent defects, but may presume that the
machinery is safe. Jd.
9. In case of a patent defect his opportunity to know will be held as knowl-
edge. d.
10. If the servant of a railroad appointed to keep the track in repair ought
to know of its condition, knowledge is imputable to the company. Id.
11. Master bound to renew perishable instruments without notice from the
servant, and is liable to latter for injury caused by a failure so to do. Baker
v. Allegheny Valley Railroad Co., 724.
12. Declarations as to the defect made immediately after the accident by a
delegate of the master are not binding, unless accompanied by an admission of
previous knowledge. Id.
13. Liability of master for injuries to servant caused by the master's neglect.
rd., note.
MECHANIC'S LIEN. See FIXTURE, 2. INSURANCE, 16. RECEIvER, 2, 3.
The written consent of the owner made necessary by statute to bind the land
for repairs by the tenant, must be absolute in its terms, and will not be suf-
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ficient if it provides that the repairs shall not be at the expense of the owner.
Hervey v. Gay, 140.
MERGER. See FOREIGN JUDGMENT, 1. MORTGAGE, 6.
MESNE PROFITS.
Board of trustees using church property tbr church purposes only, and
allowing the congregation to worship therein, are not liable for use and occupa-
tion pending litigation with contesting board whose right is finally established.
Boulden v. Alexander, 138.
MINES AND MINING. See EQUITY, 14, 15.
MISTAKE. See AMENDIENT, 3. EQUITY, 10-12.
MORTGAGE. See ASSUMPSIT, 6. DAMAGES, 2, 3. DEBTOR AND CREDITOR,
12, 14, 19. DURESS, 1, 2. ESTOPPEL, 2, 3. GROWING CROPS. NAME, 3.
NOTICE, 1, 4. TRUST, 2. USURY, 5.
J. Of Chattels.
1. When the mortgagee of personal property sells it, not as his own but held
by him as mortgagee, he does not warrant the title. Harris v. Lynn, 493.
2. The mortgagee may ,ell his own and the mortgagor's interest in the pro-
perty with the consent of the mortgagor, without giving public notice. Id.
3. And when the mortgage provides that he may sell the property at public
or private sale, no notice isrequired. Id
I. Of Realtl.
4. The purchase of the equity of redemption by the mortgagee, will be
upheld if fair. Amos v. Livingston, 763.
5. A deed of lands with a clause of redemption is a mortgage. Vijet v.
Young, 763.
6. The foreclosure of a mortgage merges the cause of action in the judgment,
but not the mortgage lien. Evansville Gas-Light Co. v. Indiana, 676, and
note.
7. Where the mortgagor has made several conveyances to different persons,
and one of the tracts so conveyed has been freed from the mortgage-lien, it will
not be decreed upon foreclosure, that the remaining tracts be sold in the inverse
order of the dates of the conveyances. Id.
8. Where pending a foreclosure suit another creditor obtains judgment, tie
mortgagee is not bound to make such creditor a party, even though by law the
lien of the judgment related back to a time prior to ihe foreclosure suit. Stout
v. Lye, 625.
9. Mortgage to secure negotiable note passes to the endorsee of the note, and
the latter is not affected by subsequent payments to the endorser, even though
he has not given notice to the mortgagor nor recorded his assignment. Bur-
haus v. Hutcheson, 551.
10. A foreclosure deed to the mortgagee gives him the same estate as a fore-
closure of the equity of redemption. Ruggles v. First Nat. Bank of Centreville,
493.
11. Growing crops pass under foreclosure deed, and the court may perhaps
provide for their preservation until possession is given to the purchaser. Id.
12. Second mortgagee is entitled to the benefit of a provi-ion in the first
mortgage that a power of sale should not be exercised without notice to the
mortgagor or his assigns, and may sue for the breach thereof. Hoole v. Smith,
813.
13. On bill to have a deed declared a mortgage, the proof must be clear and
satisfactory. Maher v. Farwell, 280.
14. Long delay in filing such bill will bar complainant's rights. Id.
15. When given and received for a fraudulent purpose is void, although
founded on consideration. Schmidt v. Opie, 278.
16. Mortgagees having notice of facts enough to put a prudent man upon
inquiry, are bound to examine the records before releasing portions of the prem-
ises. Dewey v. Ingersoll, 140.
17. Delivery of contract for purchase of land by the purchaser, to one as
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indemnity in becoming guarantor for the purchaser, without any written assign-
ment thereof, constitutes an equitable mortgage. Allen v. Woodruff, 
77.
18. The only etlect of a written assignment is to constitute constructive
notice if recorded. Id.
MUNICIPAI, BONDS. See EXECUTOR, 1. MANDAMUS, 1. MUNICIPAL 
COR-
rORATION, 9.
1. In suit upon coupons of county bonds the controlling question 
is whether
there was authority in law for issuing the bonds. Wells 
v. Board of Super-
czsors, 212.
2. Power to issue bonds for municipal subscription to a railroad 
must be
given in express terms or by necessary implication. Id.
3. Where a statute authorizing a county to create a new liability 
provides a
special way for its discharge, that way is exclusive. Id.
4. Legislature may authorize municipality to issue bonds for debt previously
incurred for street improvement without legal authority. Mutual Benefit Life
Ims. Co. v. City of Elizabeth, 213.
5. A bond containing a general obligation to pay cannot, by implication, 
be
converted into a promise to pay out of a particular fund. Id.
6. After a county has isqid new bonds, in place of bonds issued 
in aid of a
railroad under a valid law, it is e.-topped from setting up an irregularity in the
calling of the election at which the vote was taken authorizing 
the issue of the
bonds. County of Japer v. Ballon, 556.
7. Bondfide purchaser of bonds fraudulently antedated, to avoid registration
statute, can recover the purchase-money from the municipality; 
and the fact
that such bonds contain provisions for the payment of illegal interest 
will not
bar such recovery. City of Louisiana v. Wood, 419.
8. A general power to borrow money, conferred by the charter 
of a city, is
not repealed by a statute providing for the refunding of its debt and the 
issue
of registered bonds. Id.
MIUN'ICIPAL CORPORATION. See ACTION, 4. CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAw, 12.
CRIMINAL LAW, 26. iUNIcIPAL BONDS. NEGLIGENCE, 4, 7. 
NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUM ENTS, 1, 2. OFFICE, 1. ORDINANCE. 
PAUPER. WATERS AND
WATERCOuRsEs, 4-6.
1. The private property of its citizens cannot be subjected to the payment
of the corporate debt except by taxation. Lyon v. Elizabeth, 702.
2. Property used by it in the exercise of its functions of government 
cannot
be taken in execution. Id.
3. Claims of creditors may be enforced by judgment and mandamus. 
Id.
4. Property held by a city for public uses cannot be subjected 
to the pay-
ment of its debts. Upon the repeal of the city's charter, such 
property passes
under the immediate control of the state. 11erriwether v. Garrett, 
280.
5. The private property of citizens cannot be subjected to 
the payment of
the city's debts except through taxation. Id.
6. the power of taxation cannot be exercised otherwise than 
under the
authority of the legislature. id.
7. Taxes levied before the repeal of a city's charter cannot 
be collected by
a receiver appointed at the instance of creditors. Id.
8. Qtuure, whether taxes levied in obedience to contract obligations, 
or under
judicial direction, can be collected by a receiver ? Id.
9. When a municipal council is authorized to issue bonds when 
certain facts
exist, and such facts are exclusively within its knowledge, it is 
the judge
thereof, and a purchasecr can rely on its statements in relation thereto 
con-
tained in the bonds. Id.
10. An ordinance imposing a greater penalty for its violation than 
is author-
ized by charter is void. State v. Long Branch Corn., 213.
11. An authorization bycity councils after a penalty is incurred 
for violation
of an ordinance, is no defence in an action for the penalty. State 
v. Fire De-
partment, 815.
12. Where the charter commits the decision of a matter to the common 
coon.
dil, such decision may be made by resolution. Burlington v. Dennisen, 
140.
VOL. XXIX.-107
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13. The appointment of a committee to make a purchase, is plenary evidence
of the decision of the council; the passage of an ordinance is not required.
Burlington v. Dennison, 140.
14. Council may delegate power to a committee whose contract will bind the
corporation. Id.
15. Approval of mayor to proceedings of council is essential to their validity
only by special requirement of charter. Id.
16. Not liable for excavation made and paid for by its officers without the
authority of the city councils. IR'erce v. Tr4p, 702.
17. Liable for damage by construction of street according to plan prescribed
by ordinance, only when the injury results from defective execution of, and not
from defects in the plan. Foster v. St. Louis, 140.
18. In an action against a city for damages caused by defect in street, it is
sufficient proof of notice of such defect to show that either a councilman or the
street commissioner knew of it a reasonable time previous to the injury.
Logansport T. Justice, 796, and note.
19. A city, in grading its streets and constructing gutters, is not bound to
provide against extraordinary storms. Allen v. City o Chippewa Falls, 556.
20. Under statute authorizing license of hackmen, omnibus drivers " and
others pursuing like occupations," a city may require street railways to take
out license for cars. Allerton v. City of Chicago, .173, and note.
21. The police power is inherent in a municipal corporation, and cannot be
transferred. Id.
22. Power to " regulate the management" of a business includes the power
to require a license for carrying it on. Id.
23. The distinction between the taxing and the police power discussed. ld.
24. Power to regulate and license a business confers no power to impose a tax
thereon. State v. Long Branch Coin., 77.
25. May make only such regulations as to business as have relation to the
public health, morals and order. Id.
26. In the absence of express statutory authority, a city has no power to an-
thorize the use of steam motors upon its streets, and the grant of such authority
is negligence whici. will render the city liable for damage caused thereby.
Stanley v. City if Davenport, 556.
27. The fact tLat the action of the city council in granting such right waR
without authority, would not protect the city from liability. Id.
28. J. section of a city's charter provided that the city council should have
power to levy taxes not exceeding one and one-half per cent. per annum of the
taxable property. Another section empowered the courts, upon failure of the
council to make provision for a debt, to make such decrees as might he neces-
sary for levying taxes therefor not exceeding one per cent. per annum. Hd,
that notwithstanding the limit imposed by the former section had been reached,
the courts could, under the latter section, decree the levy of a tax to pay a judg-
ment debt. City of Louisiana v. United States, 625.
29. A state constitution provided, that the legislature should not authorize a
city to become stockholder in a corporation without the assent of two-thirds of
the voters. Subsequently, a charter was granted to the city providing, that it
should have power to subscribe for stock upon the vote of a majority of the tax-
payers. ield, that the charter gave no power to subscribe for stock, but only
added an additional restriction to that imposed by the constitution. Allen v.
Louisiana, 488.
30. The fact that two-thirds of the voters gave their assent would not vali-
date a subscription. Id.
MURDER. See CRIM'IWAL LAw, VIII.
NAME. See EQUITY, 6, 7.
1. Under the New Jersey Practice Act initials cannot be used for Christian
names, except in cases of parties described by initial letters in bills, notes or
other instruments. State v. Ricfards, 213.
2. Elberson and Elbertson being idem sonans, the use o one for the other In
a writ is an immaterial variance. Id.
INDEX. 851
NA[mE.
3. A statutory foreclosure is not invalidated by a change in the name and
removal of the office of the newspaper in which the advertisement is published.
Perkins v. Keller, 419.
NATIONAL BANK.
1. The demand and receipt by, of usurious interest, from endorsers upon
notes discounted by it, does not avoid a contract of guaranty to the bank on
such notes. Lazear v. Bank, 280.
2. Cannot use its funds in purchasing notes. Id.
3. Where a guaranty is given to it for all liabilities of certain parties, and it
brings suit against the guarantor, the question whether the money was partcd
with on the faith of the guaranty is exclusively for the jury. Id.
4. Only such penalties can be enforced against national banks for usury, as
are provided in the National Bank Act. N'ational Bank of Wi'nterset v. Byre,
79.
5. Defendant may set up plea of usury against national bank in the state
courts. Id.
6. Renewal notes including usury are affected thereby, and cannot be purged
thereof by having the amount credited as a payment. Id.
7. Maker of non-negotiable note discounted with national bank, cannot
defend on the ground that the bank could not deal in such paper. Bank Y.
,3illilan, 419.
NEGLIGENCE. See ADM1IRALTY, 1-3, 5. CANAL. Co.%tMtoN CAnnIER, 5-7,
10, 12, 14. CORIPORATION, 5. INTEREST, 1. INTOXICATING LIQUORS, 4.
MASTER AND SERVANT, 3-13. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 16, 17, 19, 26,
27. RAILROAD, 5, 6, 11-14.
1. Where a bank holding a draft for collection accompanied by a bill of
lading for grain, deposits the grain in the drawee's elevator before payment of
the draft, there is evidence of negligence for the jury in an action against the
bank on the subsequent insolvency of the drawee. MIiliwaukee lational Bank
v. City Bank, 557.
2. In an action for an injury arising from negligence, the burden is on the
plaintiff to show that lie was exercising ordinary care. Benson v. Titcozb, 813.
3. Certain evidence held not to show negligence in street-car driver, or to
entitle plaintiff to recover for the killing of his child by the car. J3aschek
v. St. Louis Railroad Co., 214.
4. If injury on highway i., the joint product of the plaintiff's lack of pru-
dence and the town's negligence there can be no recovery. Bocee v. Dan-
ville, 761.
5. The burden is on the plaintiff to show that lie contributed nothing towards
the accident. Id.
6. Injured feelings consequent upon a miscarriage caused by an accident,
not part of the pain naturally attending it. are too remote to be considered. Id.
7. Town liable for negligently allowiun oliect calculated to frighten horses
to remain in the highway. Bennett v. ljidd, 702.
8. Suit was brought by the party injured against the person leaving such
object in the highway, and judgment recovered. The defendant was dis-
charged under the Bankrupt Act, and plaintiff then sued the town. Held,
that the action could be sustained. Id.
9. Whether the owner of a stack of hay, burned by sparks from a locomo-
tive, is guilty of contributory negligence in stacking the hay in proximity to
the track is a question of fact for the jury, and not a question of law for the
court. C., E., S. 4 G. Railroad v. Owen, 628.
10. In an action for personal injiury caused by a railroad train, where there
are qualifying circumstances, the court is warranted in submitting to the jury
the question whether plaintiff wa- injured by his own negligence or by that
of the railroad company. Langan v. St. L., I. 4- S. Railroad Co., 626.
11. Negligence is not imputable to a person for failing to look out for dan-
ger when, under the surrounding circumstances, lie had no reason to suspect
9 ny. Id.
12. In action against the hirer of a horse, the jury found specially that the
horse was a safe one, but that defendant was notified by tie plaintiff wLen he
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hired him that he was unsafe, and that defendant's negligence consisted in his
not having hold of the lines when he attempted to get into the buggy. Reld,
that the court could not say, as matter of law, that defendant was not negli-
gent. Alonroe v. Lattin, 626.
13. Proper mode of measuring the damages to the horse and carriage in such
case explained. Id.
14. Failure of parent to keep two-year-old child off of track is not, per se,
contributory negligence. Smith v. Atchison, T. 6- S. Railroad Co., 559.
15. Letting a coal-car run down a steep grade without any one in charge,
held, under the circumstances of the case, evidence of negligence to be sub-
mitted to the jury. Id.
16. Railroad company held responsible for negligent running of car by a
mining company which, by permission of the railroad company, ran cars over
a switch-track belonging to the railroad company. Id.
17. In an action against a railroad company for negligence, it is error to
give an instruction to the jury which makes the conduct of the plaintiff the
only condition upon which his right of recovery depends, and which virtually
says that if the plaintiff was careful and prudent he may recover, whether the
defendant was negligent or not. Atchison, T. 4- S. Railroad Co. v. Combs, 559.
18. When the facts are undisputed, the question of negligence is one of law.
McLaury v. City of M1cGregor. 556.
19. Where one, while walking upon a five-foot sidewalk, and in the enjoy-
ment of sufficient light and such eyesight as to enable her to discern the limits
of the walk, stepped off into a ditch, it was held that she was guilty of con-
tributory negligence. Id.
20. Judgment for plaintiff reversed for an instruction that, "the fact of
intoxication alone" would not "prcve contributory negligence," unless the
proof showed such a degree of intoxication that "imbecility would begin to
affect" the intoxicated person. Fitzgerald v. Town of 11eston, 493.
21. Omission by railroad company of statutory signal, will not relieve a
person from the duty to look and listen. Pennsylvania Railroad Co. -t.
Riqhter, 142.
22. Where defendant's neglect consisted in the maintenance of a structure, the
danger of which was obvious to the senses long before the accident, he was
held not liable. Rains v. St. Louq, ., .31. 4- S. Railroad Co., 141.
23. Failure to protect pier by piles not such contributory negligence as will
bar recovery against vessel for negligently injuring pier. Toll-bridge Co. V.
Langrell, 77.
24. Finding that piles would have prevented the injury, is not equivalent to
finding that ordinary care required them to be maintained. Id. 78.
25. Contributory negligence is good defence, unless slight in comparison
with defendant's negligence, which was gross. Mere preponderance in degree
will not make defendant liable. Chicaqo 4- Aorthwestern Railway Co. v.
Dimick, 78; Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v.'Righter, 142.
26. One approaching a railroad must look and listen. Id.
27. C ONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE BY FERSONS WITU DEFECTIVE SENSES.
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NI :OTIABLE INSTRUMENT. See BILLS AND NOTES.
1. County warrant is not negotiable, and the county may set off against a
bona fide purchaser for value a claim held by it against the payee. Wiall v.
Monroe County, 627.
2. Nor is the county estopped by the fact that the warrant is a re-issue, and
that at the time of the re-issue the alleged set-off was known to exist. Id.
3. A blank endorsement of a non-negotiable certificate of deposit by the
payee, accompanied by delivery, will enable the holder to make a pledge of
the certificate to an innocent party, without reference to the equities between
himself and the payee. International Bank v. German Bank, 141.
4. A certificate had written across its face, "This certificate is subject to any
subsequent claim for collection or any other fees arising out of the disburse-
ment of the legacy of which this money is part of proceeds." The bank which
issued the certificate not asserting any rights under this stipulation, held, that
as between the other parties, it did not affect the operation of the foregoing
rule. Id.
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5. Change of number in a Bank of England note is not such a material
alteration as will defeat the right of a bonafide purchaser. Sffell 
v. Bank of
England, 758.
NEW TRIAL. See JuROR, 1.
1. When a party is surprised by unexpected evidence he should at 
once
move for delay, and not await the chances of a verdict. Benson v. Titcofab,
813.
2. A party cannot complain of an obscure instruction to the jury, 
unless he
has moved for an explanation or further instruction. Logansport v. 
Justice,
796.
3. Where one instruction is erroneous, but it is clear upon all the instructions
that the jury were not misled, a new trial will be refused. Id.
4. Where the verdict is not in accordance with the rule that a bonafide 
pur-
cha~er of negotiable paper before maturity takes it free of equities, 
a new trial
will be granted. Burrill v. Parsons, 352.
NOTICE. See ACTION, 10. AGENT, 9. ATTORNEY, 
6. BANKRUpTCY, 4.
DEED, 8. 10. ESTOPPEL, 2. 3. 'MAIL, 2. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 
18.
PARTNERSIIP, 17. PossEssIoN, 1, 2. VENDOR AND VENDEE, 
4.
1. The record of a mortgage with a general description of the indebtedness,
is constructive notice. Passunmpsic Saving Bank v. First Iational 
Bank, 627.
2. Party put on inquiry must inquire in the proper direction and 
use due
dili ,enee, but this is the limit of his liability. Id.
3. What will constitute reasonable inquiry must vary with the circumstances
of each case. Id.
4. Second mortgaee finding record of mortgage to retiring 
partner for the
"balance which should be due him on the purchase of said property," 
and
being on inquiry toll by both mortgagor and mortgagee that nothing was due,
is not chargeable with notice of notes given to the mortgagee, but not 
described
in the mortgage except as above. Id.
NUISANCE.
1. Where the damage i; irreparable or continuing, an injunction will 
be
granted without a previouq determination of complainant's rights by a jury.
Pennsylvania Lead Co.'s Appld, 649.
2. Lead smelting works in a fertile district enjoined, notwithstanding 
their
extensive cost and public benefit. Id.
3. Failure of adjoining owner to protest against erection of such works does
not estop him from applying for injunction. Id.
4. Courts of Common Plems of 'ennsylvania are clothed with equity 
powers
to restrain nuisance, notwithstanding that there is a remedy by indictment 
or
by action at law. Ad.
5. What constitutes a nuisance and what are the remedies therefor. Id., note.
6. Owner of house allowing brothel to be maintained there, is liable to owner
of adjoinini, premises for the special damage, including that caused by 
the fact
that other houses of like character were opened in the neighborhood as 
the
natural result of defendant'
s act. Girins v..'tddifurd, 420.
7. In ascertaining the damage, all the circumstances should be considered,
and the measure is the actual depreciation in the selling value of the property
and the loss of rent. Id.
8. Legislative authority to a corporation to do a work for its own profit, does
not authorize it to use, at whatever hazard to others, dangerous materials, 
even
though necessary to the convenient prosecution of the work. MlcAndrews 
v.
Collerd, 141.
9. It will be liable for injury, although no negligence in the work be proved
and liable for actual damages, though it has done the work in the most 
care.
ful manner. Id.
10. Where a nuisance is a public one, no degree of care will relieve the party
from liability. Id.
11. All persons who are concerned directly or indirectly in a public nuisance,
are responsible for injuries to an innocent person. Jenne v. Sutton, 628.
12. A permanent building upon a pavement in a city is per se a nuisance. In-
diana v. Burdetta, 342, and n ,te.
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OFFICE AND OFFICER. See AUCTIONEER. BONeD, 1-4. COSTS, 5. Evi-
DENCE, 6. SURETY, 4, 5, 7.
1. An appointment to, and acceptance of, a municipal office, does not consti-
tute such a contract as will obstruct a vacation of the office. Inhabitants of
Burlington v. Estlozo, 702.
2. An election to a public office, secured by means of an offer to perform the
duties fbr less than the legal fees, is void. State v. Collier, 412.
3. After a public officer has served through his term, neither he nor his sure-
ties can escape liability on his bond on the ground of the illegality of his elec-
tion. Boone County v. Jones, 557.
4. The sureties upon such bond can make no defence not available to the
principal. Id.
5. The rule as to the validation of the acts of defacto officers is one of policy,
and may be applied not only where there is no de jure officer, but where the
legal office itself no longer exists. Adams v. Lindell, 557.
ORDER. See ACCEPTANCE. ACTION, 2. SUNDAY, 6.
ORDINANCE. See MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 10, 11. SUNDAY, 7, 8.
1. Where a charter requires that all ordinances shall be published, such pub-
lication is a condition precedent to their euibrcement. Ormsby v. Loui5;tille,
269.
2. An ordinance which occupies the entire field of a former one, will repeal
such former one by implication. Inhabitants of Burlinyton v. Estlow, 702.
PARENT AND CHILD. See CONTRACT, 3. DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 7, 9, 15,
18, 19. NEGLIGENCE, 14. SEDUCTION, 1.
1. Where the circumstances render it proper, a court may make an allowance
to the parent from the child's property to defray the expense of its maintenance,
Gerdes v. Weiser, 557.
2. Where a man receives into his family the child of his wife by a former
marriage, he stands in loco parentis to such child, and is bound for its sup-
port. Id.
3. Decree of divorce, committing child to the custody of one of its parents
does not prevent a court from subsequently on habeas corpus committing it to the
custody of a person other than a parent. In re Bart, 494.
PARTIES. See MORTGAGE, S.
PARTITION. See WAY, 4, 6.
Partition sale after expiration of term without renewal of order is void.
Hughes v. Hughes, 494.
PAP.TNERSHIP. See AGENT, 14. EVIDENCE, 2. LANDLORD AND TENANT,
4.
1. Two persons buying a threshing machine and giving their joint note there-
for, under au agreement to share equally the profits and losses of its work, are
partners. Aultman v. Fuller, 214.
2. A separate creditor levied on and sold firm property, without bringing
an action to determine defendant's interest as provided by the Iowa code.
Held, that the sale was invalid as against a subsequent execution-creditor of the
firm. Id.
3. In an action for dissolution because of disputes between the partners, the
dissolution will not be made retrospective. Lyon v. Tu'eddell, 813.
4. Assumpsit by one partner against another for balance due, will not be
sustained where the declaration does not allege an account stated, or show that
the affairs of the firm have been settled. Dowling v. Clarke, 628.
5. A contract between partners which can be enforced without a, general
accounting may be enforced at law. Edwards v. Renaington, 357.
6. Partnership lands have in equity the character of personalty. Godfrey v.
White, 494.
7. Proceedings between partners for accounting may be carried on where
the parties live, irrespective of the location of the partnership lands. Id. •
8. Testator may authorize the continuance of a partnership, without subject-
ing any more of his property-to the vicissitudes of the business, than what was
embarked in it at the time of his death, and dividends honestly paid to legatees
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-annot be recovered back upon the subsequent bankruptcy of the firm. Jons
T. Walker, 494.
9. Under assignments for creditors, partnership creditors are as to individual
assets postponed to individual creditors. Davis v. Howell, 461.
10. Respective rights of creditors against individual and partnership estates.
1d., note.
11. One partner cannot admit third party to the firm without the consent of
the copartners. Love v. Payne, 535, andnote.
12. By receiving such third party as an acting partner, the other partners
may so far ratify the contract as to make him a member of the firm. Id.
f3. One partner cannot without special authority bind the firm by deed.
Walsh v. Lennon, 420.
14. But he may borrow money for the firm at any legal rate of interest and
bind his partners by any instrument evidencing such loan. Id.
15. Such instrument, though under seal, may be used as evidence of the loan.
Id.
16. Admission of one partner relative to partnership concerns, binds the
others. 17arryman v. Roberts, 374.
17. Retiring partner not bound to give notice to the successor in business of
a creditor with whom the firm has had dealings. Richardson v. Snider, 393,
and note.
18. A new firm cannot be bound without the consent of all its members for
the debts of the old. McLinden v. Wentworth, 358.
19. One partner cannot bind the firm for money borrowed by him to pay
for his share of the cap)ital. Id.
20. A firm is not liable for an individual debt of one partner, although the
consideration goes into the firm business if, as between the partners, the debt
ought to be paid by the contracting partner. Id.
21. Secret agreement between partners cannot be set up as a defence to a
suit on a firm endorsement executed by one partner for the firm's benefit.
Andrews v. Congar, 328.
22. Creditors of partner who has mortgaged his private property for a part-
nership debt, which is also secured by a mortgage on the partnership property,
are entitled to be subrogated to tile rights of the mortgagee against the partner-
ship property. Bank of Royalton v. Cushing, 813.
23. As between a subsequent mortgagee of the partner's private property,
who, having attached the other partner's interest, and having purchased the
original mortgage, foreclosed the one on the partnership property, and an
attaching creditor of the partnership property, who, having paid the decree in
the foreclosure suit, brings his bill to foreclose both mortgages, such creditor is
not entitled to be subrogated. Id.
24. Doctrine of subrogation rests in justice, not contract; it applies to sure-
ties, and not to a stranger, nor, ordinarily, a levying creditor. Id.
PART OWNER. See VESSEL.
PASSENGER. See COMMON CARER, 5-14. RAILROAD, 11.
PATENT.
1. Claims of re-issued patent will be construed with reference to the state
of the art at the date of the original invention, and the limitation of the inven-
tion in the original patent to a machine of specific construction. Swain County
v. Ladd, 281.
2. In a clear case of mistake the patefit may be enlarged by re-issue, but
this is the exception not the rule. Id.
PAUPER.
The aid furnished by a county to a pauper is a charity to which he is entitled,
and the county cannot recover from his estate. Bremer County v. Curtis, 558.
PAYMENT. See CONTRACT, 14. SUNDAY, 10. TAXATION, 1, 3.
1. When made under protest upon compul-ion by legal process is not volun-
tary, and to constitute compulsion it is sufficient if the officer manifests am
intention to enforce collection by seizure and sale of the payer's property.
Parcher v. Marathon County, 764.
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2. Money voluntarily paid to subordinate officer to procure release of goods
seized, cannot be recovered from the United States. Clark v. United bkates,
359.
3. Voluntary payment cannot be recovered back simply because paid toavoid controversy with the United States. White v. United States, 424.
PILOT. See ADxImALTY, 14.
PLEADING. See AGENT, 15. CRIMINAL LAW, 3, 4, 10, 12, 13. Du~zss, 2.
ISUERANCE, 13. LIBEL, 1, 2. SLANDER, 2. TRADE-MARE, 6.
1. There is a distinction between the pleas of a want of consideration and
of a failure of consideration ; the latter necessarily admits the original existence
of a consideration and involves an assumption of the burden of proof. Denegr
v. Bayly, 420.
2. Averment in suit upon bills of exchange that the plaintiffs "are successors
in and to (payee's) business, and, as such, are the legal and bona fide holders
of the bills of exchange," is not sufficient allegation of title. Richardson v.
Snider, 393, and note.
3. A plea which, undertaking to answer the whole declaration answers only
a part, is bad. Willing v. Bozmnan, 358.
4. A count charging one of two persons with trespass, without designating
which, is bad. Id.
5. Where a general demurrer to pleas is sustained, the defendants are not
entitled to judgment because one of several counts of the declaration is de-
fective. Id.
6. In pleading at common law, facts must be given showing compliance with
a condition precedent, a general averment of compliance is insufficient. Orms-
by v. Louisville, 269.
7. Not duplicity to allege in a single count various damage arising from one
wrongful act. lVolfe v. Beecher Manqjacturing Co., 78.
8. In declaration for injury to house alleged to be owned and occupied by
plaintiff, he cannot recover for injury to house of which he has only the posses-
sion and not the title. Id.
9. And this although he had conveyed the title to a third person without con-
sideration, for the purpose of evading an attachment. Id.
10. Even if this had constituted an equitable title, he could not have reco-
vered in his own name for injuries to the freehold. Id.
11. The court should have explained to the jury that they were not to give
damages for injury to the freehold, even though counsel had disclaimed any
damages therefor. Id.
PLEDGE. See ExECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, 4.
POSSESSION. See DEBTOR AND CREDITOnR, 4-10. EJECTMENT. ESTOPPEL,
3. LIMITATIONS, STATUTE Op, 7.
1. One who has knowledge that land is in the actual possession of another,
is thereby put upon inquiry. Mfartin v. Jones, 420.
2. The possession of land by a person at the time of his death is notice of
the interests of his heirs, to a subsequent purchaser. Mcley v. le Quality,
214.
POWER.
1. Exercise of, will not be enforced by a court of equity for the benefit of
creditors of the donee. Gilman v. Bell, 703.
2. The intention to execute, must appear by a reference in the instrument to
the power or to the subject of it, or from the fact that the instrument would
he inoperative without it. Foos v. Scarf, 814.
PRACTIC]. See AMEND3MENT, 1, 4. CRIMINAL LAW, 14. ERRORS AND AP-
PEALS, 2, 4, 8, 12, 13, 24. EvIDENCE, 10, 28. JUDGMENT, 2. MORTGAGE,
8. U. S. COURTS, 9, 14, 15, 19.
PRESUMPTION. See EVIDEXCE, 6, 23, 35. HUSBAND AND WIPE, 3.
1. If a person leaves his home and is not heard of for seven years, he is
presumed to be dead The rule does not confine the intelligence to any par-
ticular class of persons. Wentworth v. Wentworth, 281.
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2. A failure to hear from one who was known to have had a fixed place of
residence abroad, would not raise the presumption without inquiry at that
place. Wentworth v. Wentworth, 281.
PUBLIC POLICY. See CONTRACT, 7, 14. OFFICER, 2, 5. SUNDAY, 1, .3-7,
9, 10.
Contract in consideration of conveyance to railroad for depot, that no other
depot should be built by the grantees in the city, is void as against public
policy. Williamson v. C., R. L J- P. Railroad Co., 208.
RAILROAD. See ACTION, 5, 7, 8. COtMOx CARRIER, 1-12. MUNICIPAL
CORPORtATION, 20, 26. NEGLIGENCE, 3, 9-11, 14-17, 21, 25, 26. RECEIVEn, 2.
1. Sale under decree of court, of railroad "with its property and franchises,"
does not pass to the purchaser an immunity of the road from taxation. East
Tennessee, V. 6- G. Railroad Co. v. Bamblen Co., 421.
2. Cannot engage in express business. Southern Express Co. v. N. C. -St.
Louis Railroad Co., 590, and note.
3. Must provide facilities for express companies desiring to do business over
its road. Id.
4. Estopped from discontinuing such facilities to express company which has
built up large business over its road. Md.
5. Engineer in charge of train has a right to assume, that persons past the
age of childhood will heed the usual alarm signals. If, after using them with-
out effect, he uses such means as in his judgment are most advisable, the com-
pany is not liable for his failure to use other means which were at hand. Bell
v. Hannibal 4- St. J. Railroad Co., 421.
6. The mere fact that a train was moving at a dangerous rate of speed, will
not make the company liable, if the injured person was guilty of contributory
negligence. Id.
7. A railroad company selling state bonds issued in aid of the road, is
estopped from denying the validity of the bonds in a suit to enforce a statutory
lien therefor. Florida Central Railroad Co. v. Schutte, 558.
8. The part of tile statute giving a lien for the money advanced, can be sus-
tained, notwithstanding the unconstitutionality of the part authorizing the issue
of state bonds tlerefor. Id.
9. Bonafide purchasers of such bonds are not confined in their recovery
against the railroad, to the amount paid by them for the bonds. Id.
10. Landowner held entitled to damages for whole section of land injured,
and not merely for separate quarter through which railroad is constructed.
Kansas City E. 6- S. Railroad Co. v. Merrill, 494.
11. One riding on freight train on which passengers are carried is a passen-
ger, although he boarded the train without the knowledge of the conductor and
paid no fare, if tie conductor, after discovering him, allowed lim to remain.
Sherman v. St. Joseph Railroad Co., 421.
12. Where abrakeman without the conductor's knowledge, assumed to direct
a boy to perform a certain service, and the boy was injured. Held, that the
company was not liable. Id.
13. The youth of one injured may excuse concurring negligence, but cannot
supply the place of negligence on the part of the company. Id.
14. The company is liable for injury to passenger on freight car, if the rule
requiring him to ride in the caboose was not conspicuously posted, but not, if
the injury was the result of an attempt on his part to perform an unauthorized
service. Id.
RATIFICATION. See AGENT. 7. INFANT, 1-3. TORT, 1.
1. A party ratifying a contract is not bound by a separate and distinct part
of it, not incident to it or implied, and of which lie has no knowledge. Love v.
Payne, 535, and note.
2. Ratification cannot extend beyond acts fairly and reasonably implied from
the nature of the transaction. Id.
REAL AND PERSONAL ESTATE. See FENCE. FIXTURE. GuowINo CROPs.
PARTNERsHIP, 6.
YOL. XXIX.- 108
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RECEIVER. See ERRORS AND APPEAIs, 10. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 7.
1. Allowance by the circuit justice of the appeal of a receiver is equivalent
to leave by the court to the receiver to take the appeal. Farlowo v. Kelly, 628.
2. Mechanics' lien creditor of a railroad is not represented by a receiver
subsequently appointed, and his lien is not divested by a sale to pay an indebt-
edness created by the receiver if he was not made a party to the proceedings.
Sow v. Winslow, 628.
3. In the absence of a showing of some peculiar exigency, such lien would
not be displaced by an indebtedness created by the receiver in building an
extension to the road. Id.
RECORD. See AGENT, 9. BILL OF EXcEPTIoNs, 4. DEED, 8. ESTOPP3L, 3, 9.
NOTICE, 1.
RECOUPMENT. See SET-OFF.
REFEREE. See ERosS AND APPEALS, 2-5. SALE, 12.
REFORMATION. See EQUITY, 13. INsU.AcE, 7.
REMOVAL OF CAUSES. See INSURANCE, 1.
1. Congress hts not provided for the removal of a suit in which there is a
controversy not wholly between citizens of different states, and to the full and
final determination of which one of the necessary parties seeking the removal
is a citizen of the same state with one of the parties against whom the re-
moval is asked. Blake v. McKim, 483.
2. If the jurisdiction of the federal court depends upon the subject-matter
of the controversy, and this is already in its possession, there is no error in its
entertaining jurisdiction of the suit upon a transfer by agreement. Bank T.
Winslow, 281.
3. A state court, before relinquishing its jurisdiction, should be satisfied that
the conditions of the Act of Congress have been complied with. Stone v. Sar-
gent, 24.
4. The decision of the state court is reviewable ultimately by the United
States Supreme Court, but is not subordinate to the opinion of any other
federal court. Id.
5. The Act of March 3d 1875 does not take away the right of removal, on
the ground of prejudice, under sect. 639 Rev. Stat. Id.
6. A hearing before an auditor is not a trial within the meaning of the Acts
of Congress. Id.
7. The law relating to the removal of causes. Id., note.
8. Petition for removal too late, under Acts of Congress of 1866 and 1867,
after final decision of the state Supreme Court on the merits, although the
cause has been remanded for reference to a master to state an account. Jif-
kins v. Sweetser, 282.
REPLEVIN. See HUSBAND AND VIPE, 30.
1. Will lie in state court for property ofplaintiff levied on by United States
marshal as the property of another under process from federal court. Heyman
v. Cove!, 171.
2. Liability of property in possession of one court to seizure upon proces
from another. Id., note, 174.
3. Where the vendor in a sale which is illegal, because made on Sunday,
secretly retakes the property from the premises of the -endee, the latter may
bring replevin against him. Kinney v. McDermott, 737.
4. Where grain replevied was threshed and sold by the plaintiff, and upon
the trial the ownership was found to be in the defendant, the measure of his
recovery on plaintiff's bond was held to be the market value of the grain at
the time of the trial, less the cost of threshing and marketing. Clement v.
Duffy, 629.
5. In Rhode Island, an officer holding a writ of replevill with the statutory
bond, will be protected in taking the property described from the defendant
and in delivering it to the plaintiff; notwithstanding third- parties may claim
the property. Curry v. Johnson, 629.
6. Where the possession of an officer is not such that he could piaintain re-
plevin or trespass, replevin will not lie against him. Libby v. Murray, 355.
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7. Defendants having entitled themselves to a return of the property pend-
ing the action, and having disposed of it, there was no error in permitting
plaintiff to amend the complaint by increasing the alleged value of the pro-
perty. McKesson v. Sher'nan, 358.
8. The pendency of a suit upon a replevin bond will not bar an action of
trover against one who received from the plaintiff in replevin the property re-
plevied. Wyrnan v. Bowman, 358.
9. Plaintiff in replevin cannot Lonvey a good title to the property replevied,
if he is not actual owner. Id.
10. Defendant, after a voluntary dismissal by the plaintiff, may commence
an independent action on the bond and recover his damages sustained by the
taking of the property, including the value thereof. Manning v. Manning, 763.
RESCISSION. See SALE, 6, 10, 11.
REVENUE. See STATUTE, 3.
RIPARIAN RIGHTS. See WATERS AND WATERCOURSES.
SALE. See BAILMENT. DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 4-10. EVIDENCE, 8. HuS-
BAND AND WIFE, 29, 30. VENDOR AND VENDEE. WARRANTY, 1, 2.
1. Purchaser of a horse upon condition that it should be used for eight days,
and returned if he did not think it suitable, is not liable for the price upon the
death of the horse within the eight days. Elphlck v. Barnes, 240.
2. When purchaser is excused from his obligation on contract of sale or
return. Id., note 244.
3. A. took home a horse of B., intending to purchase it if satisfactory, with
an understanding that he was to use it by way of trial until a specified time, and
then, if not satisfied, bring it back to B., or if too busy for that, to let it stand
unused until B. came for it. A. continued to use the horse after the time so fixed,
and then refused to buy and offered to return it. Held, that this was evidence for
the jury on the question whether A., at the time so fixed, had determined to
retain the horse, and was therefore liable for the price, but was not conclusive
evidence. Kali. v. Klabrunde, 142.
4. Condition annexed to a sale of goods delivered to a vendee is binding
upon his assignees in insolvency, but not upon his vendees in the regular course
of business. Rogers v. Whitehouse, 282.
5. It is not essential to the validity of such condition that the vendee should
have no right to sell to others. Id.
6. The vendor in a conditional sale may, under the terms thereof, retake pos-
session of the chattel for default in payment of an instalment of the price, with-
out tendering back the money already received. Pleck v. Warner, 629.
7. Where the acceptance by the vendor of an offer is absolute, the expression
of a hope that the vendee will pay more, does not vary the contract. Phillips
v. Moor, 282.
8. A purchaser desiring to retract an offer on the ground that it was not
seasonably accepted, must notify the seller promptly. Id.
9. W.':,e the terms are fixed, and everything the seller has to do complete,
the contrawt is absolute without actual payment or delivery, and the property is
at the purchaser's risk. Id.
10. Where a machine is ordered from a manufacturer for a specific and
known purpose, there is an implied warranty of reasonable fitness for such pur-
pose, and the right of the purchaser to rescind is not destroyed either by a writ-
ten agreement as to the quality of the machine, or by the mere receipt of the
machine. Craver v. Hornburg, 764.
11. Where goods are to be delivered by instalments, the failure to receive
one instalment gives to the vendor the right to rescind. Honc v. Mf'ulert
814.
12. In the absence of fraud, the decision of one, agreed upon between the
parties to an executory contract of sale, to determine whether the goods offered
conform to the requirements of the contract, is binding. Nofsinger v. Ring,
214.
13. A quantity of barrels were sold from a large stock stored in the ware-
house of a bailee, who was accustomed to deliver to purchasers upon presenta.
860 INDEX.
SALE.
tion of a bill of sale. He was notified of the sale by both parties, and at the
request of the purchaser, to whom a bill of sale had been given, he undertook
to keep the barrels safely until called for. But they were not designated nor
separated from the rest. Held, that there was sufficient delivery to protect the
barrels from an execution levy. Carpenter v. Grahaam, 214.
14. A purchaser's delay, in removing merchandise from the charge of a
bailee, cannot subject the vendor to the risks of storage. d.
15. Fraudulent representations may be as well by acts or artifices as by posi-
tive assertions. Coyle v. Hoses, 79.
16. A mining company agreed to sell two thousand tons of ore to an iron
company and deliver it at a certain point, whence it was taken by rail to the
consignees. The contract quantity was delivered, and with more ore of the
same kind, was deposited in a pile at the point of delivery; hut the consignees
directed the railroad company to cease forwarding it for a time, as they had n1o
room for it. They paid in full for the contract quantity, but as they did not
finally receive the full amount, they sued the mining company for failure
to deliver. Held, that they could not recover. Iron Cliffs Co. v. Bld, 215.
SALVAGE. See ADMIRALTY, III. ERnORS AND APPEALS, 12.
SCHOOL.
1. The courts may by mandamus compel the admission of a pupil unlaw-
fully excluded, and such pupil is not restricted to a statutory remedy by appeal
to the county superintendent. Perkins v. Board f Directors, .4c., 790, ani note.
2. Directors have no authority to refuse to allow a pupil to attend until he
has paid for damage to school property accidentally committed. Id.
SEDUCTION.
1. A father may recover for loss of service of his infant daughter, caused by
her seduction, notwithstanding she was at the time in the service of the defend-
ant, if the father still retained the legal right to reclaim her service. Lacery v.
Crooke, 630.
2. In such case the jury are not confined to the pecuniary loss, but may
award punitory damages ; and evidence is admissible of defendant's pecuniary
condition. Id.
3. It is no objection to the maintenance of such action that defendant pro-
cured the sexual intercourse by force. Id
SET-OFF.
Items on debit side of an account cannot be relied on as a set-off without
allowing the credits or showing fraud or mistake in striking the balance.
Andrews v. Congar, 328.
SHERIFF. See EXECUTION. SURETT, 4.
1. Liable to execution plaintiff for damage caused by absence of plaintiff's
attorney from the sale, and consequent sacrifice of the property caused by erro-
neous information given by a deputy to the plaintiff's attorney as to the place
of sale. State v. Moore, 559.
2. It was the duty of the sheriff in such case, upon acquiring knowledge of
the facts, to postpone the sale. Id.
SHERIFF'S SALE. See GROWING CROPS. PARTNERSHIP, 2.
The doctrine of caveat emptor does not apply where there is a mistake made
both by the sheriff and the purchaser in selling a tract of land to which defend-
ant had no title. In such case, since the money has gone to extinguish defend-
ant's debt, the purchaser may recover it back from him. Wilchinski v. Cav-
ender, 495.
SHIPPING. See ADMIRALTY. INSURANCE, 8. VESSEL.
SLANDER.
1. In actions for, under the New Jersey statutes, any meaning deemed
advisable by the plaintiff may be imputed to the words. Andrew v. Deshler,
815.
2. It is sufficient to allege that the words are false and malicious, without
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laying a scienter, even when the words may have been part of a privileged
communication. Andrew v. Deshler, 815.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. See TRUST, 1.
1. Will not be dccrc.d of an agreement to convey land for the purpose of
d'frauding creditors. Ryan v. Ryan, 209.
2. Decree for, is a matter of discretion, and Will not be granted if claim is
suspicions and stale. H'illiams v. Williams, 143.
3. But this discretion is to he exercised in conformity with well recognised
principles. Allen v. Woodrqffi, 79.
4. A vendor accepting payments after maturity waives his right to a forfeiture,
and if lie stands by while the vendee makes improvements, the latter is entitled
to performance upon tender of the amount due, even though time was of the
essence of the contract, and there has been delay in making the tender. Id.
5. If a purchaser of land cannot maintain a bill for specific performance, one
to whom he has assigned his contract as indemnity cannot. Id.
STARE DECISIS. See UNITED STATES COURTS, 9.
STATUTE. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, II. EVIDENCE, 17, 18. UMCIPAL
CORPORATIoN, 20. ORDINANCE. RAILROADS, 8.
1. Where the letter i4 ambiguous, the courts look to the object sought to be
accomplished by the legislature. Howard v. Lacroix, 423.
2. If the text be ambiguous the caption furnishes the best guide as to such
object. Id.
3. In the interpretation of the customs laws, the law adopts the meaning
given to commercial terms by those engaged in commerce. Reci-nagle v.
Murphy, 422.
4. Where a statute of one state is derived from that of another, a decision in
the latter state construing it, rendered after the adoption by the former, does
not have that authoritative force which it would have had before the adopfion.
Griswold v. Seligman, 422.
STREAM. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 3. WATERS AND WATERCOURSES.
STREET. See CRIMINAL LAW, 8. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 17-t9, 26.
-NEGLIGENCE, 4, 7, 8, 19. NUISANcE, 12.
SUBP(E'NA. See TELEGRAPItn, 2.
SUBROGATION. See EQUITY, 8. PARTNERSHIP, 22-24. SURETY, 2.
Ward entitled to benefit of secnrities given by the guardian to his sureties
to secure them. Mforrill v. 3forrill, 764.
SUNDAY. See REPLEviN, 3.
1. Extent to which contract made on Sunday shall be deemed invalid. NVots
to Kinney v. JMcDermott, 740.
2. In a suit on a foreign note made on Sunday, the foreign statute invalida-
ting it must be proved. It is not void at common law. O'Rourke v. O'Rourke,
495.
3. Whether work done on Sunday is a work of necessity or charity is purely
a question of law. Allen v. Dule, 423.
4. But even if submitted to a jury, their verdict may be allowed to stand if
in accordance with the law. Id.
5. Raising subscriptions from a congregation to pay off a church debt or
purchase a house of worship is a work of charity. Id. " -
6. Signing and acceptance of order on Sunday, in order to enable a party
about to leave to pay a claim for labor, is not a work of necessity and is
invalid. Mface v. Putnam, 359.
7. Publication of a city ordinance upon Sunday is not a valid compliance with
a law requiring publication. Ormsli.j v. Louisville, 269.
8. Where publication is required for a certain period, the intervening Sun-
days will be counted, although no publication be made on them. Id.
9. Where a land contract was delivered on a week day, the mere fact that it
was dated on Sunday, is irmnaterial. Lamore v. Frisbie. 215. - :
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10. Payments made on Sunday and allowed on a final accounting, will not
avoid the contract. Lamore v. Frisbie, 215.
SURETY. See GUARANTY. LimiTATIoSs, STATUTE or, 5. OFwIoCR, 3, 4.
VESSEL, 5, 13.
1. Is liable on a bond, although signed only on condition that a specific
co-surety should be procured, if he had delivered it to the principal with nothing
on its face to suggest the condition. Brown v. Judge of Probate, 283.
2. Securities taken by sureties for their indemnity, inure to the benefit of the
creditor. Thornton v. Bank, 215.
3. An unauthorized extension of time by a bank, in which a note has been
placed for collection, will not discharge the surety. Prather v. Gammon, 496.
4. Judgment of amercement against a sheriff, is only primafacie, and not
conclusive against his sureties. Fay v. Edmiston,'495.'
5. In an action against the sureties, the question is not whether the judg-
ment was obtained by fraud, but whether upon the facts there was any liability.
Id.
6. Judgment against principal is not binding upon or evidence against the
surety. Lx parte Young, 815.
7. Where the sureties on a treasurer's bond are bound during his continuance
in office, "whether of the present term for which he has been elected, or of any
succeeding term," their liability continues during the succeeding terms. Peoples'
B. 6- L. Association v. WVroth, 703.
8. The acquiescence of the executive officers of a building association, when
promises to pay are given by members to the treasurer in lieu of cash, will not
discharge the treasurer's sureties from liability for loss from such credit. Id.
9. Where fines and dues are not actually received by the treasurer, the dam-
age sustained thereby is the rule for making the assessment. rd.
TAX AND TAXATION. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 9. EQUITY, 9. HUS-BAND AND WIFE, 17. MANDA US, 1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 1, 5-8,
23, 28.
1. Illegal taxes paid through a mutual mistake as to their legality, may be
recovered back. City 9f Louisville v. Anderson, 687, and note.
2. Equity will restrain the tax-collector where the owner of the land is not
the tax-debtor, and the property is not that on which the tax was laid. Seeley
v. Westport, 143.
3. Payment of illegal tax is not voluntary, and the money may be recovered
back at law. Id.
4. Interest is not allowable on taxes by way of damages, and a party claim-
ing a penalty must show a compliance with all the requirements of the law.
Ormsby v. Louisville, 269.
5. Description of property upon a tax list need not be as full or precise as
in a deed.- Id.
6. The date of the recording of the tax deed, is the time at which the Statute
of Limitations begins to run in tax title cases; and this time is not changed by
the fact, that the holder of the tax sale certificate did not obtain and record his
deed on the day he was entitled to it. Estes v. Stebbins, 496.
7. The provision requiring fifty per cent. interest upon a redemption from a
tax sale, is not unconstitutional. Id.
8. In New Jersey, on certiorari brought in aid of an ejectment to review the
proceedings on which a tax title is founded, the recitals in the certificate of sale
are primafacie evidence of the facts recited. Woodbridge v. State, 630.
9. The facts that the tax was duly assessed, and was a lieu on the lands;
and that the successive steps which led to the sale were regularly taken, if
they do not appear by the proceedings returned with the writ, must be shown
by the recitals in the certificate of sale or by'proof aliunde. Td.
10. The validity of the title derived from a tax sale, depends upon a strict
compliance with the directions of the statute. The onus probandi is upon the
purchaser at such a sale. Id.
11. Where the statute gives the power to sell to a particular officer, it must
appear that the sale was made by him,. and at the time and place at which it
was advertised. 11d.
12. REMEDIES OR ILLEGAL TAXATION, 1.
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TELEGRAPH. See EVIDENCE, 13-15.
1. Telegraphic messages are not privileged communications, and the officers
of the telegraph company may be compelled to produce them before the grand
jury. Ex parte Brown, 423.
2. A qtbpcna duces tecum, to compel the production of telegrams, should give
a reasonably accurate description of them. Id.
3. A subpoena merely giving the names of a number of persons, and calling for
telegrams between them within fifteen months, held not sufficiently certain. Id.
TENANT IN COMMON. See WAREHOUSENAN, 3.
1. The share of a tenant in common, who has by his acts held his co-tenant,
out as sole owner, is liable to its proportion of the costs of improvements made
by such co-tenant. Baird v. Jackson, 424.
2. A lien of one tenant in common on the share of his co-tenant for improve-
ments placed on the common property, is subject to a deed of trust given by
the former of his share. Id.
TENANT FOR LIFE.
As regards timber blown down by storm, is entitled to the corpus of the
proceeds of the part sold for firewood, and to the interest on the proceeds of
that sold for timber. Stonebraker v. Zollikofer, 389, and note.
TORT. See TROvER.
1. One cannot be liable as for the ratification of a tort that was not com-
mitted in his interest. Smith v. Lozo, 215.
2. In case, for the neglect of a statutory duty, the plaintiff must show that
the duty was imposed for his benefit. Smith v. Tripp, 703.
TRADE-MARK.
1. Words in common use merely descriptive of the character, composition
or quality of the article, cannot be appropriated as a trade-mark. Marshall v.
Pinkham, 560.
2. The office of a trade-mark is to point out origin or ownership, or to desig-
nate the dealer's place of business. Ad.
3. The ground upon which actions for infringement of trade-mark are main-
tained is that the law will not allow one person to sell his own goods as the
goods of another. Id.
4. The fact that an article prepared according to a certain recipe, but not
protected by a patent, has for some time been made and sold only by a certain
manufacturer, does not render it unlawful for any other person to manufacture
it. Id.
5. The proper name of the manufacturer cannot be made a trade-mark so as
to prevent any other mamfacturer of the same name from affixing such name
to a similar article made and sold by him. Id.
6. In action for injunction, if fac similes of the two trade-marks are annexed
to the complaint, it will.not e held, on demurrer, that the one is not sufficiently
similar to the other to mislead, unless the dissimilarity is so marked as to leave
no doubt in the mind of the court. Liedersdorf v. Flint, 143.
7. Plaintiff may, without misjoinder, ask for an accounting as to profits,
and for damazes. Id.
8. TRADE-MARKS, 304.
TRESPASS. See EXECUTION, 1, 2. LANDLORD AND TENANT, 11.
1. Can be maintained for breaking and entering a burial lot. Snlith v.
Thompson, 703.
2. There being evidence of malice, the plaintiff held entitled to punitive
damages. Id
3. Under a contract transferring all the pine trees the vendee "may choose
to take," the latter agreeing to pay a certain sum therefor, the vendee could
not, until he had cut the pine, bring trespass against a grantee of the vendor
for cutting timber. J.fistner v. Bird, 496.
4. It is the abuse of some special and particular authority given by Jaw, and
not of a Iceal right common to all, which will make a man a trespasser ab initio.
Turner v. :Potman, 283.
5. Where the legal right of self-defence has been exceeded, the party so
offending is liable only for the excess of force. Id.
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6. In an action for as-ault, where defendant sets up an unlawful imprison-
ment by plaintiff, tile jury should be instructed not only as to the measure
of damages in case the imprisonment was not unlawful, but also as to such
measure if the imprisonment was unlawful but the defendant used improper
force in freeing himself. Turner v. Footman, 283.
7. The right to such instructions is not waived by a failure to ask for
them. Id.
TRIAL. See CRIMINAL LAW, 14. EVIDENCE. NEw TRIAL. WITNESS, 2.
1. Agreement at the trial to amend the issue and try on the merits, merely
waives exceptions as to matters of form, and does not in any other respect
affect the legal rights. Ban qart v. .Ru7nnerflt, 815.
2. Where a case has been submitted without a jury, and at tile close of the
testimony plaintiff obtains leave to amend his declaration, it is within the dis-
cretion of the court to grant or deny a motion by defendant to vacate the smub-
mission. Bamberger v. Terry, 496.
TROVER. See AssuMPSIT, 5. REPLEVIN, 8.
CONVERTIBLE PROPERTY, 769.
TRUST AND TRUSTEE. See ACTION, 7-10. BILLS AND NOTE5, 16. EQUITY,
3. GIFT.
1. A trust to sell or improve lands, to invest the proceeds, to collect income,
to pay charges, to pay over net income and divide the estate, vests a fee-simple
title in the trustees, which detends to the heir-at-law of the survivor, aIId his
contract to sell lands of the estate may be specifically enforced. Zabriskic v.
31orris 6- Esse.r Railroad Co., 284.
2. A trust of a mortgage-debt may be created by spoken words and proved
by parol. Danser v. ll'arieick, 283.
S. Even after settlement of trustee's accounts and surrender of his bond,
assunpsit may be maintained against him by the cestui que trust to correct the
accounts and recover a balance due. Howard v. Patterson, 815.
ULTRA VIRES. See CORPORATION, 11.
UNITED STATES. See BANKRUPTCY, 6. PAYM1ENT, 2, 3.
Where an injury to a vessel in war service results from di'obedience by the
master of the orders of the commanding military officer, the government is not
responsible. White v. United States, 424.
UN ITED STATES COURTS. See ADMIRALTY, 13. ERRORS AND APPEALS,
1-5, 14, 21. EVIDENCE, 28. INSCRANCE, 1. REMOVAL OF CAUSES.
1. The judicial power of the United States extends to suits prosecuted by r.
state against an individual, in which the latter demands nothing from the for-
mer, but only seeks the protection of the Constitution and laws of the United
States against the claim or demand of the state. New Orleans, J1. J- T. Rail-
road Co. v. Mffississipli, 144.
2. A case in law or equity consists of the right of one party as well as of the
other, and may properly be said to arise under the Constitution or a law of
the United States whenever its correct decision depends on tile construction
of either. Id.
3. Cases arising under the laws of the United States are such as grow out
of the legislation of Congress, whether they constitute the claim or defence of
the party by whom they are asserted. Id.
4. Except in the cases of which the Supreme Court is given original jurisdic-
tion, the judicial power of the United States is to be exercised in its original
or appellate form, or both, as the wisdom of Congress may direct. Id.
5. When a question to which the judicial power of the union extends forms
an ingredient of the original cause, it is within the power of Congress to give
the Circuit, Courts jurisdiction of that cause, aithough other questions of fact
or of law may be inTolved in it. Id.
6. The prohibition of sect. 739, Revised Statutes, against the bringing of a
suit in a Circuit Court, in any pther state than that of which defendant is
an inhabitant, or in which. lie is found at the time of serving the writ, applies
to an attachment against defendant's property. Ex parte Des Moines 6 Min-
w.apolis Railroad Co. i 631.
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7. The act dividing the district of Iowa into four divisions, and providing
that where defendant is not a resident, suit may be brought in any division
where his property may be found, applies only to suits which may be properly
brought against a non-resident. Ex prte Des Moines 6- Al. Railroad Co., 631.
8. A joint stock company with corporate powers may sue in the federal
courts as a citizen of the state creating it, without regard to the citizenship of
its individual members. Fargo v. Louisville, New Albany 4- Chicago Railroad
Co., 529, and note.
9. A decision of the state courts as to the invalidity of state bonds under the
state constitution, will not be departed from by the federal courts except for
imperative reasons. Florida Cent. Railroad v. Schutte, 558.
10. Judgment at law on coupons attached to bonds, necessary before federal
courts can compel payment by mandamus. County of Greene v. Daniel, 215.
11. The jurisdiction of the federal courts in such suit is not ousted because
of the existence of a remedy in the state courts. Id.
12. An action cannot be maintained in the state courts to set aside a sale of
land made under a decree of a federal court, on the ground that such sale was
not in accordance with the state statutes. Moore v. Jeffers, 209.
13. The question whether the time limited for the use of a franchise has
expired is not a federal question, the validity of the grant not being disputed,
and no law impairing it being construed. France v. Mlissouri, 208.
14. A motion to advance a case to be heard with another is always denied
if resisted, but counsel may be allowed to submit printed arguments in the
other case on the questions common to both. State of Louisiana v. City of
New Orleans, 284.
]5. A petition in the United States Supreme Court for rehearing after judg-
ment cannot be filed, except at the term in which the judgment was rendered.
Brooks v. B. 6- S. Railroad Co., 284.
16. In an appeal from a state court to the United States Supreme Court, the
latter can only look beyond the federal question involved when that has been
decided erroneously, and then only to see whether there are any other issues on
which the judgment can be sustained. McLaughlin v. Fowler, 359.
17. When the defence to a bond is that it was given under a statute in viola-
tion of the federal constitution, and the state court sustains its validity, a writ
of error lies to the United States Supreme Court. Daniels v. Tearney, 412.
I S. Decision of state Supreme Court involving federal question is reviewable
by United States Supreme Court, whether such decision be expressed by re
fusing a writ of error to a judgment of the inferior court, or by dismissing one
previously allowed. Williams v. Bruffry, 416.
19. If the United States Supreme Court reverses such decision, it may enforce
its judgment by directly reversing the judgment of the inferior state court,
and entering judgment in favor of the party entitled. Id.
USE AND OCCUPATION. See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 2, 4. IIEsNu
PROITS.
UFURY. See VATXONAL BANK, 1, 4-6.
1. A contract, so far as it is void for usury, cannot be cured by a subse-
quent repeal of the law. Woolley v. Alexander, 704.
2. A penalty for reserving usurious interest in a contract, until enforced, is
subject to legislative control, and may be abolished. d.
3. Usury paid on a note, not included in it, nor endorsed on it, may be
recovered back, although the note has passed into a judgment. McDonald v.
Smith, 631.
4. Neglect of the party paying the usury to plead it in offset is no bar to
his recovering it in an independent suit. I1d.
5. Where usury has been paid on a mortgage note, and the mortgage has
been foreclosed, and the usury was deducted on the making of the decree,
although this was done at the instance of an attaching creditor, while the payer
of the usury protested against such deduction, such usury cannot be recovered.
Id.
6. Sums in excess of legal interest paid for bonus on, and renewal of a loan,
constitute usury, and should be credited as payments. Walter v. Foutz, 359.
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VARIANCE. See NAME, 2.
An attachment recited that a judgment was recovered in February term.
The record showed that the verdict was rendered at November term, but that
the motion for a new trial w4s not overruled until February term. Held, that
there was no variance. Bank v. Wreckler, 357.
VENDOR AND VENDEE. See FIXTUR, 6,7. FRAu's, STATUTz Ci. Hus-
RAND AN WIFE, 38. SALE. SPECIFIo PERFORMANCE.
1. One may waive by parol a lien on lumber reserved in a conditional deed,
to secure the purchase price of the land on which the lumber was cut. Stone v.
Fairbanks, 704.
2. If he does, he is estopped from setting up title to the lumber against a
third party purchasing of one, who had bid it off at a sheriff's sale to satisfy a
debt against the grantee. Id.
3. The facts, that the lien-holder saw the plaintiff cutting the timber; that
he made no objection to it; and that the evidence tended to show that he knew
he was cutting on some contract with the grantee, tended to prove a waiver,
and should have been submitted to the jury. Id.
4. Purchaser having notice of a deed in the chain of title has constructive
notice of its contents, and is not protected by the most express representation
on the part of' the vendor, that it contains nothing affecting the title. Patman
v. Harland, 816.
5. On an agreement for the. sale of land, the purchaser becomes in equity the
owner of the land, and the vendor becomes the owner of the purchase-money.
Schmidt v. Opie, 278.
6. The trustee in a deed of trust to secure a debt, being about to sell the land,
the defendant R., who was at that time a minor, agreed with the creditor that
if A. would buy at $300, he would give his note for the balance of the debt,
which was done. Afterwards, R. having become of age, A. sold and conveyed
the land to him. R.'s note being unpaid, this action was brought to obtain a
personal judgment against him, and to subject the land to its payment. Held,
that it would not lie. Maupin v. Grady, 216.
VERDICT. See JURY, 10.
In an action upon an insurance policy, a verdict for the full amount of the
policy with six per cent. interest and ten per cent. damages for delay, is suffi-
ciently certain without stating the figures. .Relfe v. Wilson, 496.
VESSEL. See ADMIRALTY. HUSBAND AND WIPE, 4. INSaunNcE, 8.
1. Majority of owners may remove the master whether he be part owner or
not, and only a written agreement under Sect. 4250, Rev. Stat. can defeat
this power. In re Schr. Emory, 68.
2. This power may be exercised without cause aud in violation of the master's
engagement. Id.
3. A contract by part owner for the sale of a sailing right, cannot be enforced
either by estoppel or by direct proceedings. Id.
4. Part owners of a vessel are entitled to intervene in any proceeding in rem.
Mitchell v. Chambers, 422.
5. Judgments against a vessel and against her managing owner and the
surety upon a recognisance for her release, are part of a general adjudication
of the liability. Id.
6. Part owners will not be regarded as partners, unless it distinctly appears
that they are so. Id.
7. A vessel master has no authority as such, to find bail for the ship on behalf
of the owners. Id.
8. The ship's husband cannot, in the absence of special emergency, bind his
co-owners by obtaining bail for the vessel's release. Id.9. The assent of the co-owners thereto cannot be implied from mere silence.
Id.
!_ , Co-owners are nbt personally liable on claims incurred before they
acquired their interest. Id.
11. The necessity for obtaining the release of a vessel does not imply that it
was-obtained upon conditions binding the owners personally. Id.*
12. Sembler that a ship's husband is not warranted in assuming extraordinary
INDEX.
VESSEL.
powers if he can communicate with the owners by telegraph. Mitchell v.
Thambers, 422.
13. One who consents to become surety must see that he acts by authority
of the principal or his duly authorized agent. Id.
14. The interest of a managing owner entitles him to act for himself in ob-
taining bail, and the surety cannot hold the co-owners liable. Id.
VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCE. See DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 
1, 11, 15, 18,
19. HUSBAND AND WxpE, 23.
VOLUNTARY PAYMENT. See PATNENT. Tax, 1, 3.
WAIVER. See AsSUMPSIT, 5. INSURANCE, 6. SPECIFIC PERFOR3UNCE, 
4.
VENDOR AND VENDEE, 1.
WAR. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 2. UNITED STATES.
WAREHOUSEMAN.
1. A warehouseman issuing receipts is not a guarantor of the title of the
depositor to the goods. Mechanics' 4- Traders' Ins. Co. v. Kiger, 496.
2. Contract of grain warehouseman is one of bailment and not 
of sale, al-
though the grain is mixed with other grain and delivery is made 
from the
mass. Sexton v. Graham, 216.
3. The owners of such grain are tenants in common of the entire mass 
with
the other owners. Id.
4. Where the warehouseman wrongfully ships from grain of depositors 
stored
with his own an amount greater than that remaining in the warehouse, 
the
amount so remaining will be considered as the property of depositors. 
Id.
5. A warehouse-receipt issued by a warehouseman upon his own 
grain as
collateral security merely, is invalid under the Iowa Code. rd.
6. Delivery to the holder of such receipt, of the warehouse keys 
is not a
valid delivery of the grain as against a prior purchaser who holds a receipt. 
Id.
WARRANTY. See COVENANT, 1. HUSBAiD AND WIFE, 38. INSURANCE, 
15.
MORTGAGE, 1. SALE, 10.
1. In suit on note given for a fertilizer, the court charged that if the 
fertil-
izer was bought upon plaintiff's representation that it was a valuable fertilizer,
and it was worthless as a fertilizer, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover,
but that if it was a valuable fertilizer, the plaintiff was entitled 
to recover.
Reld, that the court sufficiently instructed the jury as to what they must find 
to
constitute a warranty. Crensaw v. Lyle, 360.
2. A representation that a machine is a very good machine, and will 
do nice
work, is not a warranty. Work v. McConnell, 283.
WATERS AND WATERCOURSES. Sie CANAL. CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW, 3.
CONTRACT, 11.
1. Landowner liable for diverting the sources of a stream flowing from 
t
swamp on his land, if such stream was permanent, but not if the stream 
flowed
only in times of excessive rain or melting snow. Boynton v. Gilman, 
631.
2. Contract for sale of spring and right to convey water over vendor's 
land
not broken by sale of land by vendor to railroad, and erection of works 
which
drain'the water before it reaches the spring. Brain v. Marfell, 93.
3. Right of riparian proprietor to underground percolatingwater. Id., 
note.
4. The right of a city to use subterranean waters is subject to the restriction
that it shall not interfere with the natural surface streams. City of Emporia
v. Soden, 632.
5. In action against a landholder in a city for injury to adjoining land 
by
overflovi of stream, it appeared that the city had constructed sewers 
emptying
into the stream. Held, 1. That the defendant was only liable for damage
caused by the natural flow. 2. That it made no difference, that the proportion
of damage done by the natural flow was difficult of ascertainment. 3. 
That
the defendant and the city were not joint tort-feasors. Sellick v. Hall, 
80.
6. It being claimed that the city had by legal proceedings taken the 
whole
stream for a public sewer. Hd, that the question was not as to the regularity
of the legal proceedings, but whether the city had, taken actual possession 
and
control. Id.
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WAY. See INJUNCTION, 1.1. Merely using a way, open to, and occupied by the public, has no tendenyto prove that the use is adverse. O'Neil v. Blodgett, 816.2. Such use with the public, raises the presumption that it is not adverse. Id.3. The use must not only be open, notorious and continuous; hut under aclaim of right, brought to the attention of the plaintiff. Id.4. When real estate is divided among heirs by commissioners of the ProbateCourt, a right of way, of necessity or by implication, may exist over one partto another. Goodall v. Godfrey, 816.5. If such right of way is appurtenant to that portion set out as dower, andnot simply appurtenant to the freehold estate of the dowager, it is not extin-guished on the death of the widow. l..6. Distinction, as to a right by implication, between a partition among heirs.and a purchase by a stranger. Id.7. So far as it is a question of necessity, reasonable, not strict, necessity isthe test; hut such right is determined not on the ground of necessity alone, butby the acts of the parties and in the light of circumstances. Id.
WILL. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 28. LEGACY. PARTNEnSHIp, 8.1. When there exists no reasonable ground for contesting probate, or thelitigation is needlessly protracted or expensive, allowance of costs and counselfees to caveators should be denied. Mallett v. Bamber, 360.2. Certain evidence held insufficient to impeach testator's capacity to makea will. In re Will of Lewis, 360.3. Testator gave to his daughter A. his farm, and provided :It is furthermy will, that the said A. reside on the aforesaid farm after my decease, andtake proper care of the same. In case they (I mean A. and her husband) shouldnot see proper to move on the same, then I order my executor hereinafternamed, to sell the same at public vendue." Held, that the estate of A. was afee-simple, and not defeasible by her non-residence thereon, and that A. havingmoved on the farm, the power of sale could not be exercised upon her subse-quent removal. Casper v. Walker, 103.
4. Rights and obligations of devisees to reside on land devised. Id., note.5. Lands were devised after the death of a devisee for life to such persons aswould be her heirs-at-law of lands held by her in fee-simple. The land havingbeen sold under statutory proceedings, the life tenant conveyed her interest inthe fund to her children. Held, that the will fixed the life tenant's decease as theperiod for the ascertainment of heirs, and that the children were not entitled toimmediate payment. Bartles's Petition, 98.6. Apportionment of an annuity charged by will on several parcels of realestate, can be made only by an agreement to which the annuitant is a party.
Perkins v. Emory, 704.
WITNESS. See CumenwL LAW, 5, 22. EvDENcE, 7, 27, 30, 31.1. Cannot be impeached by mere proof that he was once charged with acrime in a judicial proceeding. McKesson v. Sherman, 360.2. Cannot, without leave of the court, be re-examined on a matter as towhich he has been previously examined; but the ground of objection must bespecifically stated when he is recalled, or his testimony will not be excluded.The rule, however, does not prevent the recalling of a witness in rebuttal.
Osborne v. O'Beilly, 816.
3. The payer of a negotiable note is not a witness to the fact of a payment,the note having been assigned subsequently, the payee being dead, and suitbrought in the name of the assignee. Farmers' Mutual Ins. Co. v. Wells, 632.4. In Vermont, when one party to a contract is dead, and the contract hasbeen assigned, so that the estate or heirs, have no interest in it, the assigneestands upon the proviso of s. 24, c. 36, Gen. Sts. in all cases where the con-tract is the cause of action, and the survivor cannot testify-otherwise wherethe contract is a matter collateral to the cause of action. Id.
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